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University of Pittsburgh, 2017
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the industrial organization of China’s
manufacturing sector from an empirical perspective. It uses structural estimation to look
into the performance of China’s manufacturing sector with a particular emphasis on the
steel industry - a key sector in China that produces half of the world’s steel. This disser-
tation also examines the financial constraints that manufacturing firms face.
Chapter 1 documents the development of the steel industry in the past two decades.
Chapter 2 studies productivity differences in vertically-integrated Chinese steel facilities,
using a unique dataset that provides equipment-level information on inputs and output
in physical units for each of the three main stages in the steel value chain, i.e., sintering,
iron-making and steel making. We find that private integrated facilities are more produc-
tive than provincial state-owned facilities, followed by central state-owned facilities. This
ranking lines up with our productivity estimates in the two downstream production stages,
but central state-owned facilities outperform in sintering, most likely because of their su-
perior access to high-quality raw materials. The productivity differential favoring private
facilities declines with the size of integrated facilities, turning negative for facilities larger
than the median. We attribute this pattern to differences in the internal configuration
of integrated facilities, which reflect the greater constraints confronting expanding private
iv
facilities. Increasing returns to scale within each stage of production partially offset these
costs, and rationalize choices of larger facilities.
Chapter 3 draws on the Chinese Industrial Survey Data from 1998 to 2007 to examine
financing constraints in the manufacturing sector. Building on the Euler Equation approach
and applying the dynamic GMM estimation, we find that on average private firms face more
obstacles in accessing credit than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Contrary to the widely
accepted view that China’s private sector is largely excluded from formal credit allocation,
we find that large firms, both state-owned and private, are not credit constrained. Medium
and small SOEs are financially constrained, although to an extent less than their private
counterparts of similar size. Moreover, the capabilities of firms in accessing external finance
differ by economic region and across industries.
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1.0 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE STEEL INDUSTRY
1.1 MASSIVE EXPANSION
The Chinese steel industry has expanded dramatically due to development policies that
promote strong domestic demand for steel products. China has led the world in steel pro-
duction since 1996. Major products in the steel industry skyrocketed as Figure 1 illustrates.
Crude steel grew at 11.5 percent per annum in China over the period 1996 to 2015 whereas
the world’s production grew at 4.1 percent annually. China peaked in steel production in
2014, producing 822.3 million tons of crude steel.1 Although 2015 witnessed a drop in steel
production (803.8 million tons), China alone accounted for 49.6 percent of the world’s total
production. Along with the rapid expansion in production, China has become the world’s
largest importer of iron ore as well. The share of Chinese import in world’s total iron ore
import rose steadily over time and reached 65 percent in 2015 (see Figure 2).
With dramatic output expansion, the value of industrial output in the steel industry
shot from 388.32 billion RMB to 6,406.70 billion RMB from 1998 to 2011 (see Table 1).2
The period 2003 to 2008 witnessed the strongest growth. Despite the dramatic increase in
the value of steel output, its share in the total industrial output enjoyed a modest increase.
1All data come from China Steel Yearbook (various years) unless otherwise indicated. And the figures
presented are from the author’s calculations.
2To keep consistency with the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (hereafter NBS), Table 1 covers
above-scale firms in the 2-digit smelting and pressing of ferrous metals industries including iron smelting,
steel smelting, steel pressing and smelting of ferroalloy. The NBS stopped reporting gross value of industrial
output and employment at industry-level since 2013.
1
The value of the steel output made up 5.7 percent of the total industrial output in 2002, and
the share reached its peak value of 8.8 percent in 2008, after which a slight fall occurred,
bringing down the share to 7.6 percent in 2011.
The number of firms in the steel industry also experienced a pronounced increase (see
Table 1). While the number of steel firms dropped slightly between 1998 and 2000, it
increased steadily over the period 2000 to 2008. The number began to decline from 2009
on to 6,742 firms. Even so, compared to 1998, the total number of firms more than doubled.
On the other hand, employment dropped significantly between 1998 and 2002, during which
the industry shook off 4.6 million workers, or 16 percent, largely due to restructuring in
China’s state sector. Even though the number of firms picked up from 2001 on, another
two years went by before employment began to go up. With the number of steel firms
more than doubling, employment increased by merely 2 percent to 34 million by 2011.
Therefore, the annual output per worker enjoyed a remarkable increase, jumping from 40.2
tons to 206.5 tons of crude steel per worker from 1998 to 2011.
1.2 INDUSTRIAL UPGRADING
1.2.1 Product Quality Upgrading
In addition to the significant expansion in production, the quality of the Chinese steel
products improved as well. Even though the majority of the finished steel products supplied
by the Chinese steel firms are low value-added products, the past decade witnessed an
improvement in quality of domestically-produced steel. A number of Chinese firms stepped
into the high-end market to produce materials for autos, electric appliances and delicate
machines, Figure 3 indicates that the high value-added steel products (including cold-
rolled sheet and strip, clad and coated sheet and electro-sheet) rose from 23.2 million tons
to 166.33 million tons between 2004 and 2015. Over the same period, while total finished
2
steel products in 2015 were 3.8 times as much as 2004, high value-added steel experienced
a seven-fold increase. The share of high value-added steel in total steel products went up
from 7.6 percent to 14.8 percent.
A question thus arises: Who contributed to the production of high value-added prod-
ucts? In 2004, the 71 key vertically-integrated steel firms (among which 17 are private)
produced 65.5 percent of the high value-added steel, and in 2011 the 82 (among which 49
are private) key firms produced about half of the high value-added steel.3 Noteworthily,
private steel firms increased their share in high value-added products over time, and in
2011, produced more than half of the high value-added steel. Regarding small private
firms, in 2004, on average 8.3 percent of the products were high value-added while the
share rose to 17.2 percent in 2011. This suggests that the large number of small private
firms - mostly rolling mills - also experienced quality upgrading over time. Even though the
private sector has been playing an increasingly important role in the Chinese steel industry,
except for a couple of big private firms, the importance of an average single private firm in
China, if not negligible, is limited compared to the SOEs.
In addition, there is significant variation across the key firms in their capacity to pro-
duce high value-added products. The central SOEs displayed the highest capability to
produce high value-added products. For example, the high value-added products took up
a proportion of nearly 29.9 percent and 21.2 percent in the total finished steel products at
Baosteel and Wuhan Steel respectively - China’s top steel producers. The share for Hebei
steel - a provincial SOE - in contrast, was 8.14 percent, which is 4.7 percentage points
lower than the industry average.
3The key (hereafter) firms are member firms of the Chinese Iron and Steel Association that includes all
SOEs and big private steel firms with annual production over 1 million tons. The steel firms excluded by
the Chinese Iron and Steel Association are small-scale private firms.
3
1.2.2 Technology Upgrading
The Chinese steel industry has experienced rapid technological upgrading since the early
1990s. Figure 4 shows the share of steel produced through continuous casting, an advanced
technique in steel casting as opposed to ingot casting.4 In 1990, 25.1 percent of crude steel
was produced by continuous casting, and in 1998, the share reached 70 percent. In the
subsequent 8 years, almost all steel makers in China upgraded to the continuous casting
technique. In 2015, 98.3 percent of the steel was made by continuous casting. On the other
hand, in terms of steel making, the energy-consuming open hearth furnace (OHF) process
was completely eliminated in the late 1990s (see Figure 5). Even though China was not at
the industry’s technology frontier, it caught up with the advanced technology rapidly.5
1.3 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
China began to export steel products since 1990 but remained a net importer for over
a decade. As the world’s largest steel producer, China has been unsurprisingly playing
a big part in the international market for steel products. Figure 6 presents the imports
and exports of finished steel products (rolled steel) from 1998 to 2015. Despite substantial
expansion in steel production, steel imports grew steadily until 2003, when it reached a
peak amount with net imports mounting to 30.2 million tons. The year 2004 saw a decline
in imports whereas exports started to take off, resulting in a 50 percent decrease in net
imports. The sharp rise in steel exports eventually made China a net exporter in 2006, and
the net exports climbed to 45.8 million tons in 2007. Although the exports plummeted in
2009 by 58.4 percent due to the Great Recession, China remained a net exporter. The year
4Continuous casting is the process whereby molten metal is solidified into a “semifinished” steel for
subsequent rolling in the finishing mills. Prior to the introduction of continuous casting in the 1950s, steel
was poured into stationary molds to form ingots. Since then, “continuous casting” has evolved to achieve
improved yield, quality, productivity and cost efficiency. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous-casting
5Data in this section are from the World Steel Association.
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2010 witnessed an immediate recovery in exports by 73 percent, which guaranteed China’s
role of a net exporter of steel products. Steel export increased by 50 percent in 2014 and
continued to rise notably in 2015. The net exports continued to expand since then. On
the whole, the steel imports fell steadily since 2006, the steel exports on the other hand
displayed significant volatility.
Figure 7 illustrates the structure of steel imports/exports by presenting information on
low value-added and high value-added products.6 Two major findings emerge. First, the
net imports of high value-added steel fell substantially over time, enabling China to become
a net exporter of high value-added steel in 2012. While the share of high value-added steel
in total exports grew gradually from 11 percent to 22.3 percent, which translates into an
increase of 23.5 million tons of high value-added steel from 2004 to 2015; the share of
the high value-added imports remained stable between 50-60 percent, with tonnage down
sharply by 57.4 percent. Second, China remained a net exporter of low value-added steel.
The exports of low value-added steel were volatile, and its share in total exports fell from
39.3 percent in 2003, to 17 percent in 2009, and rose significantly afterwards, ending up
with 44.4 percent in 2015. The imports of low value-added steel dropped by 40 percent in
volume between 2004 and 2015 but its share increased slightly by 3.1 percentage points.
To conclude, the change in trade structure illustrates the structural change in Chinese steel
production.
6Long products are key examples of low value-added steel that include rail, section, bar, rebar and wire
rod, which mainly serve the construction sector. High value-added products include cold-rolled sheet and
strip, clad and coated sheet and electro-sheet. Cold-rolled sheets and strips are key examples of high value-
added steel that are crucial components for automobile and electric appliances. Note that the examples of
high and low value-added products illustrated in Figure 7 do not add up to the total imports/exports.
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1.4 EXCESS CAPACITY
Rapid industrialization in China stimulated strong domestic demand for steel and therefore
massive investment in the steel industry. Investment in fixed assets accelerated between
2001 and 2005, growing at 43 percent per annum. It slowed down massively in the subse-
quent two years and sped up again afterwards at an average annual rate of 14.6 percent
over the period 2008 - 2012 (see Figure 8). The investment began to drop since 2013,
nonetheless, the level in 2015 remained higher than 2011 by 3.4 percent. Consequently,
China’s steel capacity expanded massively from 134.2 million tons to 1.13 billion tons be-
tween 1998 to 2015 (see Figure 9). Despite Beijing’s repeated directive to cut capacity,
the total steel capacity climbed steadily. Key firms took a significant proportion of steel
capacity in the industry, and its average share reached 82 percent over the period 1999 -
2015.7 Steel capacity of China’s key firms rose steadily whereas that of small firms fell in
several years. Figure 10 illustrates that the capacity growth rate of the small steel firms
was more cyclical than that of the key firms. In contrast, the key firms raised capacity
more smoothly, and contributed 76.6 percent of the increased capacity (981.4 million tons)
from 1999 to 2015.
Questions thus arise: What results in the distinct patterns of capacity expansion be-
tween the two groups of firms? Why was the cyclical pattern more salient for the small
steel firms? Several channels could explain the observed patterns. First and foremost,
the preferential government treatment provides big firms with cheaper raw materials (iron
ore), finance, land and electricity, etc. As a result, they are able to expand even when
steel prices are low and industrial policy aims to limit steel development.8 Support from
the central government largely enhances the central SOEs’ capability to expand. As to key
7The key (hereafter) firms are member firms of the Chinese Iron and Steel Association that includes all
SOEs and big private steel firms with annual production over 1 million tons. The steel firms excluded by
the Chinese Iron and Steel Association are small-scale private firms.
8For example, during my interview with an engineer at Wuhan Steel, he mentioned that Wuhan Steel
was able to carry out almost any projects before getting the central government’s approval, because it was
only a matter of time for the firm to get official permission from the NDRC.
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provincial-level firms, despite Beijing’s directive to harness capacity, they keep expanding
under local governments’ tacit permission, as these firms are important contributors of
local tax and employment.
The small private firms, on the contrary, mostly rely on their own resources to finance
investment, hence are profit-driven and are more likely to respond to market conditions,
such as steel prices and demand. Moreover, the small firms are also more likely to be-
come targets of local governments when the central government strengthens regulation
and demands reductions in steel capacity.
Rapid expansion has produced unintended consequences, notably massive excess capac-
ity, which has aroused heated debate among researchers and policy makers. The capacity
utilization rate of crude steel was 85.4 percent in 1998 and declined by 14 percentage points
over the next two decades.910 Overall, the capacity utilization rate of the key firms was
above the industry average(see Figure 11), nonetheless, the difference from the average
utilization rate at industry-level narrowed down over time and began to increase since
2013.
Total excess capacity attained 323 million tons in 2015, 15 times the 1999 figure (see
figure Figure 12). Even though the small firms on average made up approximately 18
percent of total capacity, their share in excess capacity was significantly higher, averaging
at 33 percent (see Figure 13). For example, in 2007, 63.4 percent of excess capacity
was generated by the small steel firms while they merely accounted 26.6 percent of total
capacity. Therefore the small firms generated disproportionately higher excess capacity.
In addition, Figure 14 shows that the share of excess capacity generated by the small
firms is largely consistent with the cyclical pattern of the capacity growth rate. 2002
and 2004 are exceptional in that the growth rate of capacity was low whereas the excess
capacity remained high. The drastic surge of steel capacity in 2001 and 2003, which led
9According to my interview with some steel employees, the actual utilization rate is lower than 70
percent.
10Note that the U.S. utilization rate was averaged around 81 percent in the 10-year period dating back
from 2011. Data source: 2011 Annual Statistical Report. American Iron and Steel Institute.
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to considerable excess capacity in the subsequent years. Capacity began to fall since 2014,
during which the small firms generated approximately 40 percent of total excess capacity.
1.5 LOW CONCENTRATION
The Chinese steel industry displays low concentration. The production share of the four
largest steel producers (CR4 hereafter) in China is less than 30% (see Figure 15), whereas
the corresponding shares in the U.S. and Japan are 75% and 53%.11 CR4 began to decline
in the early 2000s and reached a historic low in 2005 at 17.9 percent. Between 2006 and
2010, CR4 slightly recovered. It declined again since 2011, ending up with 19.7 percent in
2013, 8 percentage points lower than the 1998 level.
The Chinese central government sees the emerging private steel firms as trouble and has
struggled to make structural changes since the mid-90s. Merger and acquisition (M&A) is
one of the key policies that the center imposes to shake out small steel firms and restructure
the industry around a few state-owned giants subject to its direct supervision. Regulation
and resource allocation would be more effective in a concentrated industry from the cen-
ter’s viewpoint. In the 10th Metallurgy Five Year Plan, the State Economic and Trade
Commission, for the first time, brought up the initiative of M&A in the steel industry.
The Plan emphasized that large vertically-integrated groups should be established, and
that small firms should mainly aim at realizing production specialization and serving local
markets. However, the document did not lay out specific consolidation plans. However,
before 2005, only a limited number of M&A transactions took place in the steel industry,
most notably was the acquisition carried out by Baosteel.
Since the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC hereafter) launched
the Steel Industry Development Policy in 2005, the central government has put in great
11Data source: Bin Qi. ýý=Rû½¥)À{Ä½(Capital Market Will Determine the Fate of
China’s Transformation). www.ftchinese.com, 07/26/2013.
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efforts to promote consolidation in the steel industry. In the 11th Five Year Plan, the NDRC
encouraged large and competitive steel firms to conduct M&A transactions both within and
across provinces, and even across ownership as well. Additionally, the NDRC instructed
that the Ministry of Finance, Social Security and Treasury support M&A transactions in
the steel industry.In the Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalization Plan for 2009-2011
and the 12th Five Year Plan, M&A was again set as one of the top policy priorities.12
The past decade witnessed a large number of M&A transactions in the steel industry,
mainly including five types of M&A: first, within-province between central and provincial
SOEs; second, within-province between provincial SOEs; third, cross-province primarily
between central and provincial SOEs; fourth, between private firms; last, between SOEs
and private firms.1314 Notably among all the M&A transactions, most prevailing were the
first three types, while the cross-ownership transactions were rarely successful.
1.6 DYNAMICS OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY
This section exploits the Chinese Industrial Survey Data to provide evidence on the dy-
namic features of the Chinese steel industry over the period 1998 - 2007. It particularly
focuses on the changing roles of the SOEs and the emergence of the private sector.1516
In 1998, SOEs played a dominant role in the steel industry, contributing 66.3 percent
12See Table A1 and Table A2 for the detailed description of the M&A policies.
13Central SOEs are under the direct supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Provincial SOEs are under the direction of provincial or
regional SASACs.
14See Table A3 and Table A4 in the appendix for M&A the major transactions over the period 1998 -
2012.
15In this section and Chapter 3, SOEs refer to firms that are registered as state-owned enterprises, state-
owned jointly operated enterprises and wholly state-owned companies. This definition differs from the one
used in Chapter 2, in which shareholding limited and other limited liability companies controlled by the
state are also categorized as SOEs. I present more details in Appendix A.3.1.
16In this section, the steel industry includes iron smelting, steel smelting and steel smelting but excludes
smelting of ferroalloy.
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of the gross value of industrial output (GVIO), 65 percent of profit and 74.4 percent of
employment. In 2007, the shares of the GVIO, profit and employment declined to 23.7
percent, 24.3 percent and 29.2 percent, respectively. In terms of large SOEs, firm number
fell from 72 to 48 over 1998 to 2007, and the GVIO share from 58.1 percent to 22.6 percent.17
Correspondingly, the employment share dropped from 61.4 percent to 28.1 percent. Over
the same period, profit share of the large SOEs declined significantly as well. In 1998, the
profits realized by the large SOEs exceeded the total profits in the steel industry, which
suggests that the rest of the industry was loss-making. However, in 2007, the large SOEs
only contributed to 24.0 percent of the total profits in the industry. Despite the shrinkage
of the state sector, the SOEs are still playing an important role in the steel industry.
In sharp contrast with the shrinkage of the state sector’s share, private steel firms
expanded rapidly in the past decade. In 1998, 12.4 percent of firms were private and
the share in firm number climbed to 63.0 percent in 2007. The private steel firms only
accounted for 1.8 percent of the total industrial output in 1998, however, the share rose to
20.1 percent in 2007. As to employment, the private sector absorbed 23.2 percent of total
steel employment in 2007, whereas private steel firms merely made up 1.6 percent of the
steel employment in 1998. The share of profit realized by private firms also soared from
5.3% to 15.4%. Notably, a number of large private firms even gained a leading role in the
steel industry. For example, the leading private firm - Sha steel - is ranked among China’s
top-five by tonnage, and the firm expanded dramatically in the last decade, with its share
of crude steel output rising from 2.8 percent to 4.55 percent between 2004 and 2011. And
the firm is widely considered as the leading producer of construction steel thus its pricing
of rebar is closely watched by its competitors.18 As part of its expansion strategy, Sha steel
also took an active part in M&A from 2006 to 2010.
The private firms gradually gained recognition of the Chinese government given their
17Detailed size classification is presented in section 3.3.1.2.
18FACTBOX-China’s 10 biggest steel mills in 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/china-
steel-output-idUSL4N0B02B020130131.
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important role in the steel industry. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT hereafter) entitled the private steel firms with the legal standing. For instance, in
2012, MIIT endorsed entry of 45 plants industry-wide, two thirds of which were private
firms.
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2.0 OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTIVITY IN
VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINESE
STEEL INDUSTRY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Increases in productivity are an important source of economic growth for firms, industries
and countries. Researchers have documented sizeable and persistent productivity differ-
ences between producers – even within narrowly-defined industries – and identified their
elimination as a potentially important source of productivity growth.1 Understanding the
sources of these differences requires accurate measures of productivity, a task often hin-
dered by issues of endogeneity and measurement.2 But even if these problems can be
addressed, identifying the sources of these differences is handicapped by the fact that pro-
ductivity analysis is usually carried out at the aggregate firm level. In sharp contrast,
production activity of individual firms often involves vertically-integrated operations car-
ried out in multiple production units. Technologies and productivity likely differ by stage
of production. Aggregate data and analysis miss this dimension, leaving as important re-
search questions how firms configure their production operations and then their link with
performance.
1See for example, Syverson (2004) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
2De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) show how the absence of producer-level input and output prices, for
example, leads to the estimation of revenue-based productivity measures that can reflect aspects other than
the true efficiency of the producer.
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Unlike prior productivity studies that focus on the firm level, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this chapter is one of the first to investigate the underlying sources of productivity
differences between production facilities through the lens of facilities’ internal structure. In
particular, this chapter studies vertically-integrated steel producers in China. By fact of its
size - the sector now produces half of the world’s steel - China’s steel industry is important
both domestically and internationally. The sector also remains heavily state-dominated. A
recent literature has documented sizeable productivity differences between firms and sec-
tors in China that appear tied to ownership and the regulatory environment.3 State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) often have better access to capital, technology, inputs and human re-
sources, differences that may not be easily captured by available data (e.g. Haggard and
Huang (2008)).
Drawing on a unique data set that provides equipment (hereafter interchangeable with
machines/furnaces) level input and output information in physical terms by stage of pro-
duction, we estimate production functions separately for the three main stages in steel’s
value chain (sintering, pig-iron making and steel making).4 Following Domar (1961), we
then integrate our productivity estimates within each stage into estimates for integrated
facilities, using as weights either the estimated elasticities of material inputs in pig-iron
making and steel making or the ratio of the value of sinter and pig-iron to steel. The
richness of our data allow us to measure the efficiency of producers at integrated facility
level, and more important, to decompose differences in performance by ownership type
into process (stage) and equipment level differences, thereby providing new insight into the
internal dimensions of complex industrial operations.
We find that private facilities are on average 6.2 percent more productive than central
state-owned facilities, and 2.3 percent higher relative to provincial state-owned facilities.
With value-added in the steel industry 25 to 30 percent of the gross output, these modest
3See for example Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Hsieh and Song (2015), Brandt (2015), Berkowitz et al.
(2016).
4Our estimation builds on the control function approach introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and developed further by Ackerberg et al. (2015) and Gandhi et al. (2016).
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productivity differences translate into sizeable differences in profitability.
These differences do not capture the full story however. First, productivity advantages
enjoyed by private facilities in downstream production stages (iron-making and steel mak-
ing) are partially offset by nearly 9 percent lower productivity upstream in sintering. Likely
underlying this gap is central state-owned facilities’ superior access to higher quality raw
material. With better access to iron ore, the productivity advantage of private facilities
would be even larger. Second, we find that the productivity premium of private facilities
declines with their size, and actually turns negative for facilities larger than the median.
Private facilities smaller than the median size are 20.7 percent more productive than central
state-owned facilities, and 5.7 percent more than provincial state-owned facilities.
This pattern is linked with how private firms internally configure their production
facilities as they expand their steel production: They install more machines/furnaces of
larger sizes, but machines/furnaces that are systematically smaller in size on average than
those in state-owned facilities. The expansion path of private facilities drives down their
relative productivity through two distinct channels: First, scarce managerial resources of
private facilities key to the coordination of production across stages are now spread more
thinly. Second, within each stage of production, relative equipment-level productivity of
private facilities declines sharply with size as a result of fewer years experience with these
newer technologies. Difficulties in hiring more capable workers and managers may also delay
the realization of experience and learning effects associated with these new technologies.
Underlying the decision of private firms to build relatively smaller machines/furnaces as
they expand are several factors including tighter restrictions on equipment size and invest-
ment, difficulty in accessing higher quality raw materials, and possibly credit constraints.
Our study suggests that in the context of increasing returns to scale at the stage and facility
level, the productivity premium of private facilities would be significantly higher if these
constraints as well as those associated with accessing better human capital were removed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data
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and presents key facts that help guide the empirical analysis. We provide an empirical
approach to identify multi-stage productivity in section 2.3, followed by a discussion on
productivity differences and the underlying sources in section 2.4. We discuss potential
biases resulting from measurement errors in section 2.5 and conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
2.2.1 Steel Production Technology
Vertically-integrated steel production involves a complex series of individual processes that
use coal as the primary energy source and iron ore as the basic raw material (Ahlbrandt et
al. (1996)). A steel facility integrates production in four major links along the production
chain: sintering, pig-iron making, steel making and steel rolling (see Figure 16).5 The
process of sintering is basically a pre-treatment to transform iron ore fines into a high
quality burden called sinter for use in the iron-making facility - the blast furnace. The
principle of sintering involves the heating of iron ore fines along with flux and coke fines
or coal to produce a semi-molten mass that solidifies into porous pieces of sinter with
the size and strength characteristics necessary for feeding into the blast furnace. It is
basically an agglomeration process achieved through combustion.6 Sinter, together with
coke, pulverized coal and limestone are then fed into the top of a blast furnace, while hot
air is blown into the lower section of the furnace through a series of pipes, setting off a
chemical reaction throughout the furnace as the material moves downward.7 The molten
pig-iron from the blast furnace along with oxygen and fuel are then fed into a basic oxygen
furnace to produce steel, which is called primary steel making. Modern steel making can
also incorporate a secondary steel making process, which involves refining of the crude
5We provide a detailed description of steel technology in appendix A.2.
6http://ispatguru.com/the-sintering-process-of-iron-ore-fines-2/
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blast-furnace
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steel.8 The semi-finished steel produced in vertically integrated firms is finally shaped
into sheets, bars, wire, and tube steel of desired thickness and uniformity through a metal
forming process in rolling mills.9
Technologically, larger blast furnaces incur smaller heat losses and enable more efficient
heat recovery.10 However, larger furnaces require higher-grade iron ore. The use of low-
grade ore in larger blast furnaces increases energy intensity, generates more waste, and
may even shorten the life expectancy of the blast furnaces.
2.2.2 Data
We construct a unique monthly-level data set on the facilities of vertically-integrated firms
in the Chinese steel industry from January 2009 to October 2011.11 Over this period,
production of reporting firms in our sample represents sixty percent of the total steel
output in China.12 The reported data are in the form of equipment-level information
on inputs and outputs in physical units for each of the three major stages of production
(sintering, pig iron making and steel making). Input information includes key material
inputs, standardized energy consumption, number of workers, size of equipment (capacity)
and utilization rates.13 These data are supplemented by information on ownership, year
of establishment and location.
Our analysis centers on the first three major stages of production, i.e. sintering, pig-
8 In this process, alloying agents are added, the level of dissolved gases in the steel is lowered, and
inclusions are removed or altered chemically to ensure that high-quality steel is produced. See Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steelmaking
9https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling-(metalworking)
10http://ietd.iipnetwork.org/content/blast-furnace-system
11The underlying data are collected by the Chinese Iron and Steel Association (CISA) as part of regular
data collection efforts from all firms with annual steel production over 1 million tons.
12Three-quarters of the output not covered is production by private firms. This includes the production of
smaller non-member private firms, and more important, the output of some member private firms. Notable
omissions include Shandong Rizhao Steel, with an annual production capacity of 10 million tons. Also
excluded are facilities ran by the headquarters of Baosteel, a central SOE that is generally acknowledged
to be the most technically advanced steel firm in China.
13For steel rolling, we only have aggregate firm level information.
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iron making and steel making, and excludes steel rolling. We do so for several reasons.
First, finished rolled steel products can be highly differentiated, and differ in value added,
final usage, and price. Output however is only reported in physical terms. Second, we
only have data on total production of rolled products at the firm level rather than the
product or the plant level. The input information is similarly aggregated across products
and plants. And third, while the main purpose of sintering and pig-iron making is to
meet the immediate consumption needs of the next stage in the production chain, firms
often sell or hold inventory in semi-finished steel for later use. Therefore, between steel
making and rolling, there is a dynamic dimension to decision-making that our data cannot
capture. Despite this omission, we still capture a high percentage of the activity in the
sector. In an average steel firm, the total value-added generated by the three stages under
our consideration is more than double that of the rolling stage, or nearly seventy percent
overall.14
Steel production in China is a highly vertically-integrated activity. Out of total of 81
firms for which we have production data, 70 undertake sintering, 71 are involved in pig-
iron production and 68 make steel. An individual firm may also operate more than one
integrated facilities. At the sinter-iron-steel level, we compiled data on 136 fully vertically-
integrated facilities, operated by 59 firms.15 Figure 17 provides an illustration of the typical
make-up of a firm in our sample. Each firm may operate multiple integrated facilities; each
facility houses a sintering plant, a pig iron making plant and a steel making plant; each
plant in the value chain link may involve production in multiple production units, i.e.
sintering machines, blast furnaces or basic oxygen furnaces, respectively.
2.2.2.1 Ownership We categorize firms by three basic types of ownership: central
SOEs, provincial SOEs and private firms. Central SOEs are under the direct supervision
14We base these calculations on a 2015 report by the China Mingsheng Bank: Research on the Steel
Industry and Suggestions on Development Strategy.
15See appendix A.2.1 for the detailed methodology that we used to link the machines/furnaces across
stages. We lose observations from a small number of firms and integrated facilities because of missing data.
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of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(SASAC). We also define firms that have been merged into central SOEs as central state-
owned. Provincial SOEs are under the direction of provincial or regional SASACs. Private
firms in our sample include joint-ventures (JVs), wholly owned foreign firms and privatized
SOEs.16
China’s steel industry continues to be state dominated. Although their role has declined
significantly the last decade, data at the national level for 2014 suggest that nearly half
of steel production still comes from state-owned firms. Table 2 provides a breakdown of
ownership for our sample, which is skewed in favor of state-owned firms, at the equipment
level by stage of production and by integrated facility. In each of the three stages of
production, between seventy and eighty percent of machines/furnaces are state-owned.
State-owned firms are also consistently the source of eighty percent of total production,
with the remainder coming from private firms. Within the state sector, provincial SOEs
dominate.
2.2.2.2 Size Steel firms span a wide range of sizes at both the equipment and integrated
facility level. By industry convention, we measure the size of a sintering machine by its
effective area; size of a blast furnace as its effective volume; and the size of basic oxygen
furnace as its tonnage. We define the size of an integrated facility as the total size of
basic oxygen furnaces within the facility. These size measures directly reflect production
capacity.
Table 3 provides summary data on equipment size for each stage of production by
ownership. A clear ranking emerges: On average, machines/furnaces of central state-
owned facilities are the largest, followed by those of provincial state-owned and then private
facilities. A typical private machine/furnace is only 60 percent of the size of a central state-
owned machine/furnace. The average size of a private pig-iron furnace, for example, is 698
16Privatized SOEs were the product of restructuring efforts in the state sector in the late 1990s and early
2000s.
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cubic meters compared to 1230 for a furnace of a central state-owned facility. Note also
in columns (4) and (5) the wide range of equipment sizes within each ownership group.
Table 4 provides comparable information at the integrated facility level. Central SOEs
operate the largest facilities, which on average are more than twice as large as those of
the private facilities (301 tons versus 131 tons), and a third larger than the facilities of
provincial SOEs (301 tons versus 227 tons).
In Table 5, we break down integrated facilities into size quartiles and report for each
quartile the total number of facilities by ownership and their respective shares of total steel
production. Almost half of the facilities in central SOEs are in the largest size quartile:
they produce 13.3 percent of total steel, and make up the largest share of total production
by central state-owned facilities. The number of facilities of provincial SOEs is fairly evenly
distributed throughout the quartiles, but those in the largest size quartile play a dominant
role in total steel production. In sharp contrast with the state-owned facilities, only a
single private integrated facility lies in the largest size group. Most private facilities are
smaller in size than the sample median. In terms of the total production of private facilities
however, the integrated facilities in the third quartile are the most important, and produce
37 percent of the steel by private facilities.
2.2.2.3 Internal Structure of Integrated Facilities As part of a single integrated
facility, firms will typically operate multiple production units, e.g. sintering machines, blast
furnaces or basic oxygen furnaces, in each stage of production. In Table 6 we report the
average number of machines/furnaces and their average size for each stage of production
by ownership and facility size. As before, we break down integrated facilities into size
quartiles. As a general rule, the number of machines/furnaces used in each stage increases
with the facility quartile. The increase however is less than proportional to the increase in
the facility size, implying an increase in average machine/furnace size with the size of the
integrated facility. For central state-owned facilities, the number of sintering machines and
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blast furnaces actually falls with facility size. For steel, they increase, but less rapidly than
they do in either provincial state-owned or private facilities. This behavior gives rise to
systematic differences in the number of machines/furnaces and their size in each stage of
production as the size of the integrated facility increases. In particular, central state-owned
facilities consistently operate the smallest number and largest machines/furnaces in each
size category, followed by provincial state-owned and then private facilities. Alternatively,
as private firms expand their integrated facilities, they do so using more machines/furnaces
of smaller average size compared to SOEs.
2.3 ESTIMATING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY OF
INTEGRATED FACILITIES
This section describes a framework to estimate total factor productivity of multiple stage
production systems. Section 2.3.1 discusses the timeline of firms’ decision. Section 2.3.2
presents the theoretical framework and the methodology to construct productivity for
integrated facilities. Section 2.3.3 explains the details of our estimation procedure.
2.3.1 Description of Decision-Making
Firms make choices regarding investment and production. At the beginning of each year,
a firm observes its state, which includes observable variables that affect their input access,
output market and borrowing/regulatory constraints. Based on its initial state, the firm
chooses its targeted level of total production to maximize current profit. This production
must then be allocated among integrated facilities and machines/furnaces in each stage to
minimize its total production cost. After observing production, the firm learns its produc-
tivity. At the end of the year, the firm decides on investment, which depends on the current
state and productivity. Moreover, the choice of investment (i.e., the size of the facility, and
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its internal configuration) is limited by current regulations (mostly on the minimum size
of the equipment) and has dynamic implications: first, larger machines/furnaces are less
flexible on input choice and potentially more costly to maintain, which affects the expected
payoff when there is uncertainty in the input market; and second, larger machines/furnaces
enjoy the benefits of increasing returns to scale.
Since we have short panel data, we leave the investigation of the full industry dynam-
ics for future research.17 To reconcile with the monthly frequency of our data at facility
level, we focus on the monthly production instead of yearly production at each facility and
assume that production decision is made independently by each facility. At the beginning
of each month, each facility observes its stock of capital and labor and then its individual
productivity of machines/furnaces. Based on these observables, the facility chooses its
intermediate input for each equipment in the last stage. Note that the facility obtains its
last-stage intermediate input through a second-to-last stage production. Moving backward,
the facility chooses its intermediate input for each equipment in the second-to-last stage.
The process continues in this manner until the first stage of production. Following conven-
tion, we assume that intermediate input choices are monotone with respect to productivity
in each corresponding stage. At the end of this month, the facility decides on hiring/firing
employees and maintaining/utilizing certain machines/furnaces in the next month.
2.3.2 A Model of Multiple-Stage Production
In each period t, an integrated facility (facility “i”) engages in three major stages of pro-
duction, i.e. sintering (stage “1”), pig iron making (stage “2”) and steel making (stage
“3”). Along this production chain, output in each stage serves as the key material input
for the production of subsequent downstream. For simplicity, we assume that each stage
17Note that this paper centers on productivity differences by facility ownership related to facilities’ internal
configuration. We lay out a heuristic model in the appendix A.2.3 to illustrate the nature of the choices on
equipment size and equipment number subject to various constraints facilities may face.
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(plant) involves a single machine/furnace.18 A complete production process is described
as below:
Yi1t = min{eωi1tLα1i1tKβ1i1t, γ1Ri1t}ei1t , (2.1)
Yi2t = e
ωi2t+i2tLα2i2tK
β2
i2tR
γ2
i2t, (2.2)
Yi3t = e
ωi3t+i3tLα3i3tK
β3
i3tR
γ3
i3t (2.3)
where
Yi1t = Ri2t,
Yi2t = Ri3t
and Ri1t represents crude iron ore fine, Yi1t and Ri2t denote sinter, Yi2t and Ri3t pig
iron, and Yi3t denotes the final product steel. Our measurement of capital Ki·t is the
capacity of the equipment in this stage, and Li·t is the corresponding number of employees.
Productivity ωit is Hicks-neutral. While each stage uses a different technology, Yi1t = Ri2t
and Yi2t = Ri3t reflect the intrinsic linkage of multiple-stage steel production. As sintering
is an agglomeration process that reshapes iron ore to the size and strength necessary for
pig-iron making, this stage of production is assumed Leontief in materials.19
Applying the Leontief first order condition for sintering, we proceed with the following
18We will deal with multiple-equipment production later.
19Substitutability may exist between raw iron ore and labor (capital), mostly likely due to the quality of
iron ores. However, we do not have information on the raw iron ores used in sintering.
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(log) production system:
yi1t = α1li1t + β1ki1t + ωi1t + i1t,
yi2t = α2li2t + β2ki2t + γ2ri2t + ωi2t + i2t,
yi3t = α3li3t + β3ki3t + γ3ri3t + ωi3t + i3t,
yi1t = ri2t,
yi2t = ri3t
One advantage of the above production system is that it allows intuitive aggregation of
stage productivity. In particular, we obtain such an aggregate for each integrated facility
by combining the above (log) production functions for the three stages following Domar
(1961):
yi3t = ωit + α1γ2γ3li1t + α2γ3li2t + α3li3t + β1γ2γ3ki1t + β2γ3ki2t + β3ki3t + it
where ωit ≡ ωi3t + γ3ωi2t + γ2γ3ωi1t and it ≡ i3t + γ3i2t + γ2γ3i1t are facility-level
productivity and facility-level noise, respectively. Intuitively, the facility-level productivity
ωit reflects the sum of productivity in each stage of production weighted by its importance
in the production chain using elasticities.
Alternatively, we can use the value shares of pig iron and sinter out of the total value
of steel as the corresponding weights. We assume that producers face perfect competi-
tion for sinter, pig iron and steel, the price of which are P1, P2 and P3, respectively. We
omit the facility subscript and time subscript t in the following illustration. Iron making
(steel making) plants choose labor L2(L3) and intermediate material R2(R3) to maximize
profits, while capital K2(K3) is predetermined.
20 The first order conditions with respect
to material R2 and R3 and the inter-linkage equality equations Y1 = R2 and Y2 = R3 imply:
20Labor could be a dynamic choice too. We examine this more fully in our discussion of the estimation
approach.
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γ2 =
P1Y1
P2Y2
γ3 =
P2Y2
P3Y3
Hence we obtain the alternative weights:
γ3 =
P2Y2
P3Y3
(2.4)
γ2γ3 =
P1Y1
P3Y3
(2.5)
In addition, for the integrated facilities that have multiple machines/furnaces in each
link of the production chain, before aggregation, we first construct a weighted average stage
productivity measure using as the weight either the share of deterministic components of
production (KαLβRγ) or the share of machine/furnace size.
2.3.3 Estimation Approach
For estimation, we adopt the control function approach developed by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and rely on a production unit’s choice on intermediate inputs to control for unob-
served productivity (Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)). A major advantage of our data is that
it contains equipment-level information on inputs and output, which allows estimating pro-
duction functions by stage and the calculation of equipment-level productivity estimates.
A standard procedure has two steps.21
In the first step, we use energy input eist to control for unobserved TFP ωist. For stage
s ∈ {2, 3}, the energy input is determined by predetermined capital and labor, as well as
21We abstract from firms’ entry/exit decisions since they are not prominent in the data. At this stage, we
do not take into account monthly entry/exit decisions on machines/furnaces, but this could be dealt with in
a manner similar to Olley and Pakes (1996). Effectively, we can estimate the probability a machine/furnace
shuts down and use it as a control in our estimation.
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TFP:
eist = φst(kist, list, ωist).
Following Ackerberg et al. (2015), we assume that φst(·) is strictly monotone in ωist con-
ditioning on (kist, list). This implies that the above relationship can be inverted:
ωist = φ
−1
st (kist, list, eist).
Therefore, we obtain our first step estimating equation in which the output y is a semi-
parametric function of inputs (kist, list, eist, rist)
yist = αslist + βskist + γsrist + φ
−1
st (kist, list, eist) + ist
As usual, we collect the deterministic terms and denote them as Φst(kist, list, eist, rist) ≡
αslist + βskist + γsrist + φ
−1
st (kist, list, eist). Note that for stage s = 1, the same analysis
follows by leaving out ri1t due to the Leontief technology.
Ackerberg et al. (2015) argue that it may take longer to optimally adjust capital and
labor input use than intermediate inputs, which include materials and energy. Since our
data are on a monthly basis and include large SOEs that face larger hiring and firing costs,
labor is likely to be fixed or quasi-fixed. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
demand for intermediate inputs depends on productivity and the predetermined capital
and labor input. The advantage of using energy inputs as control variables is two-fold:
first, energy input is measured in terms of standardized coal, which addresses the issue
of potential bias resulting from quality differences in inputs; and second, using energy
input for the control function throughout all three stages keeps our estimation consistent.
We approximate Φt(kit, lit, eit, rit) by a high order polynomial and use OLS regression for
estimation.22 We also include ownership dummies (Downership), time dummies (Dt) and
province dummies (Dprovince) in the regression. In pig-iron making, we adjust material
input r by the percentage of pure ore content to control for quality variation. Basic oxygen
22 To simplify illustration, the subsequent analysis abstracts from stage subscript s.
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furnaces (steel making) differ significantly in the share of steel that goes through secondary
refining. One of the major goals of secondary refining is to remove impurities from the
molten steel, so the intensity of secondary refining potentially reflects the quality of pig
iron used in steel making. To control for input quality in steel making, we also include in the
first stage a dummy to capture whether furnaces carry out secondary refining (Dsecondit)
and then the share of steel that goes through secondary refining (secondit).
In the second step, we estimate the parameters θ ≡ (α, β, γ) ∈ Θ by GMM, which
exploits a Markov assumption on the TFP and the timing of input choices. Θ denotes
parameter space. In particular, we assume that TFP follows a first-order Markov process:
ωit = g(ωi,t−1) + ξit
which says that the current productivity shock consists of an expected term predicted by
productivity at t−1 (ωi,t−1) plus a deviation from the expectation, often referred to as the
“innovation” component (ξist). Note that ωit is identified up to θ from the first step after
taking out measurement error and unanticipated shocks from output. We regress ωit on a
linear function of ωi,t−1 to obtain g(ωi,t−1).23 Denote ωit(θ) ≡ Φˆt(kit, lit, eit, rit) − αlit −
βkit − γrit. For a given θ, g(·) can be estimated and thus ξist (up to θ) is obtained. The
latter is used to construct the moment conditions:
E[(ξit(θ) + it)

li,t−1
lit
kit
ri,t−1
Φi,t−1(ki,t−1, li,t−1, ri,t−1)

] = 0.
Since the capital stock is a state variable at t, it should be orthogonal to the innovation
shock on productivity at t. We use current labor (lit) as an instrument for itself because
of its dynamic feature. We also include labor at t− 1 as an additional instrument. And we
23The results are robust to higher order polynomials.
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use lagged material input ri,t−1 as an instrument for rit. As pointed out by Gandhi et al.
(2016), the use of ξit + it rather than ξit alone in the moment condition is more general.
We search over the parameter space Θ to find αˆ, βˆ and γˆ that minimize the above moment
conditions.
We use the GMM procedure to identify separately production function coefficients
for each individual stage s, s = {1, 2, 3}. As is commonly done, we also add firms’ age
to the production function to control for potential systematic differences in technology
resulting from the learning-by-doing process.24 In steel making, we allow the status of
secondary refining (Dsecondi,t−1) and the share of secondary refining (secondi,t−1) to enter
the productivity evolution process since secondary refining technology may potentially
impact the law of motion of productivity.
Our use of measures of output and inputs in physical units introduces measurement
errors, which can bias our estimates. We do not capture potential quality differences in
output, or in the facility’s human capital. The number of employees that we use to measure
labor abstracts from differences in workers’ skill level. Similar issues arise in our use of
equipment capacity as our measures for capital stock. In Section 2.5, we return to these
issues and provide several robustness checks for differences in input and output quality.
2.4 MAIN RESULTS
2.4.1 Production Function Coefficients and Returns to Scale
Table 7 presents estimates of the production functions for sintering, iron making and steel
making, the three major production stages along the value chain for steel. For each stage of
production, we report results using both OLS and GMM. For sintering, the coefficients are
24Ideally we want to use a machine/furnace’s age to capture this process. Lacking this information, we
use the firm’s age.
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only provided for labor and capital, and not for materials, reflecting the assumed Leontief
technology. The use of input and output in physical units eliminates price biases. Our
GMM estimates correct for any endogeneity bias due to the potential relation between
input usage and unobserved productivity. In addition, disaggregated input information
allows us to estimate production functions at each individual stage, without imposing any
assumptions on input expenditure allocation.25
For individual production parameters, the differences between the OLS and GMM
results are relatively small. The elasticities are largest for materials, followed by capital
and labor. Of the three stages, sintering is the most capital intensive, followed by pig-iron
and steel making. More important differences emerge with respect to estimates of returns
to scale. Most notably, our GMM estimates imply increasing returns to scale, and thus
falling long-run average costs, in each stage of production.26 The sum of the input elasticity
is largest for sintering (1.12), followed by steel making (1.06), and iron making (1.03).
Increasing returns to scale prevails in all three stages of production, and we now take
a look at the increasing returns to scale at the facility level. As discussed before, the
facility-level production function can be expressed as:
yi3t = ωit + α1γ2γ3li1t + α2γ3li2t + α3li3t + β1γ2γ3ki1t + β2γ3ki2t + β3ki3t + it
This facility-level production function in our setup reflects the nature of production. First,
inputs in different stages are not perfect substitutes, an assumption that is implicitly im-
posed in the traditional firm-level production function. Workers may specialize in individ-
ual stages of production, making them less than perfectly mobile across stages. Second, up-
stream inputs, namely, labor and capital, contribute to the entire production chain through
25The bias in production function coefficients from a commonly used revenue production functions arises
from several sources. First, relying on sales and expenditure data will not deliver the vector of production.
Second, even with no input and output price variation, the OLS estimation could generate biased estimates
due to the well-know simultaneity and selection biases. In addition, input information at the firm level forces
one to estimate an aggregate production function for a multi-product firm unless one imposes assumptions
on input expenditure allocation (De Loecker and Goldberg (2014)).
26We replicate the OLS and GMM estimation for a thousand bootstrapped samples, and find that the
mean of the returns to scale from GMM is statistically larger than the returns to scale from the OLS.
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their role as intermediate material providers. Therefore, the facility-level increasing returns
to scale is characterized by the sum of the capital and labor elasticities in each stage of pro-
duction weighted by the material input elasticities, i.e., (α1+β1)γ2γ3+(α2+β2)γ3+(α3+β3).
By plugging in the estimated elasticities, we obtain a degree of increasing returns to scale
1.14.
The degree of increasing returns to scale at the facility level is larger than the returns
to scale in the individual stages, suggesting that the three stages contribute to overall
increasing returns in a mutually reinforcing way. Our estimates are also larger than several
recent estimates for the industry, notably, an estimate of 1.03 by Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2015) for the US, and 1.07 for China by Sheng and Song (2012). 27
2.4.2 Dispersion of Productivity
We derive TFP (Total Factor Productivity) estimates for each stage of production using
the production function estimates above. In Table 8, we report two measures of equipment-
level dispersion for productivity: the standard deviation of TFP, and the ratio of TFP of
machines/furnaces at the 90th percentile to those at 10th percentile.28 Several things are
noteworthy. First, dispersion declines as production moves downstream. While sintering
machines at the 90th percentile are more than twice as productive as the machines at the
10 percentile, in pig-iron the ratio is 30 percent, and in steel making, the 90th percentile
furnaces are 25 percent more productive than the 10th percentile furnaces. At the level
of integrated facilities, the 90:10 ratio is 1.91. Second, these differences are much smaller
27 Possibly underlying these differences is some combination of the estimation of an aggregate production
function, and in the case of Sheng and Song (2012), a revenue production function. The latter is necessary
because of the lack of firm-level price information. De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) point out that variation
in both output and input prices in a revenue production function likely results in a downward bias in
production function coefficients and therefore a lower returns to scale. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker
(2015) construct firm-level input and output deflators, and thus effectively estimate a production function
in physical terms.
28The 90:10 ratios for sintering, iron making and steel making are based on the average productivity
of machines/furnaces over time.The ratio for integrated facility is based on the average productivity of
integrated facilities over time.
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than estimates for Chinese manufacturing in 2005 by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who find
a 90-10 ratio of 11.5, or six times our estimates at the facility level.29
2.4.3 Productivity Differences by Ownership at Equipment Level
We are interested in the effect of ownership on equipment-level productivity. In Table 9,
we report estimates of productivity by ownership for each stage of production. Estimates
are obtained from simple OLS regressions of the log of equipment-level TFP on ownership
dummies that also control for the effect of seasonality with the use of monthly dummies.
In these regressions, equipment of central state-owned facilities are our omitted category.
In both pig-iron making and steel-making, private facilities have a productivity advantage
over central state-owned facilities, 5.2 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively. Differentials
favoring private facilities in both stages are slightly smaller in comparison with provincial
state-owned facilities. In sharp contrast, the productivity ordering by ownership is reversed
for sintering: Sintering machines of central state-owned facilities are 8.6 percent more
productive than private facilities, and 10.2 percent more productive than provincial state-
owned facilities.
Estimates in Table 3 suggest important differences in the size distribution of equipment,
with central state-owned facilities consistently running the largest machines/furnaces, fol-
lowed by provincial state-owned facilities, and then private facilities. To identify the role
of equipment size in explaining productivity differences by ownership, we add to the pre-
vious regressions an interaction term between equipment size and our ownership dummies
and report the estimates in Table 10.30 Three findings emerge: First, the coefficient on
size suggests a decline in TFP as size expands in central state-owned facilities, our ref-
29There are a number of possible explanations for these differences. First, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s
estimates also reflect productivity differences within industries, but their estimate is calculated over all
industries. Second, their estimates are based on a value-added rather than gross aggregate production
function. As they point out in the paper, the measure of productivity should reflect the quality and variety
of a plant’s products, not just its physical productivity.
30Note that in these regression we may be picking up the systematic (and unobserved) correlation between
the size of the equipment and overall number of equipment the firm is running.
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erence group, in all three stages. Second, TFP of private equipment declines relative to
central state-owned facilities as size expands in all three production stages, with the ef-
fect more pronounced (and statistically significant) in iron-making and steel production.
These results imply that for larger machines/furnaces, the TFP advantage of private over
state-owned facilities disappears and turns negative. Finally, for provincial state-owned
facilities, the productivity gap with central state-owned facilities narrows in sintering and
iron-making as equipment size expands, but widens in steel.
What might help to explain the reversal in the productivity ranking in the case of
sintering? A regular supply of iron ore is critical to the running of sintering machines.
SOEs, especially central SOEs, typically enjoy privileged access to iron ore.31 Central SOEs
source imported iron ore through long-term contracts directly with the importers, which
enable them to build up inventories of iron ore when prices are relatively low. In principle,
sourcing difficulties might force private facilities to operate their sintering machines at lower
rates of capacity utilization, which then show up as lower productivity. Data on capacity
utilization however reveal only modest differences by ownership in the case of sintering.32
Nonetheless, sourcing difficulties related to private facilities’ more limited access to higher
quality iron ore might hold the key to the differences we observe in productivity.33
In general, the quality of domestic iron ore is much lower than that of imported ore.
This is reflected, for example, in the ore’s percentage of silica, a chemical substance that
lowers the quality of sinter and also adversely affects the production process. For domestic
iron ore, the silica content ranges from 6.5 to 12 percent. By contrast, imported iron ore
is more homogeneous in pure ore content, and contains only 4 percent silica.34 Over the
three-year period between 2009 and 2011, steel firms of all ownership in China relied heavily
31Interview with a steel consultant at Shanghai Securities Research Institute in December, 2014.
32Capacity utilization is measured here as the ratio of operating days to total calendar days minus
scheduled maintenance days. Private facilities actually operate slightly more intensively than central state-
owned facilities by 1.8 percentage points.
33Factors influencing sintering process. July 8, 2013. http://ispatguru.com/factors-influencing-sintering-
process/
34The information on iron ore fines is extracted from Yu (2004).
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on imported ore, however private firms used two-thirds more domestic iron ore than did
SOEs: 33.3 percent versus 20 percent.35 Data for 2012 reported in Table 11 indicate that
rich ore fines - a measure of the quality of crude ore used in sintering - account for 56.1
percent of total crude iron ore processed in central SOEs, while the proportion of rich ore
fines in private firms is lower by 14.3 percentage points, or 25 percent. This difference is
statistically significant.
Sintering is positioned at the very beginning of the value chain and entails the produc-
tion of high quality burden out of crude iron ore fines. The use of lower grade domestic
iron ores by private facilities necessitates additional processing in order to produce the iron
ore of the desired quality for pig-iron production. This ties up the processing equipment
longer and requires additional labor inputs, both of which translate directly into the lower
equipment productivity we observe.36
2.4.4 Productivity Differences in Integrated Facilities by Ownership
Recall that we can use either elasticities of material inputs or value shares to integrate
estimates of stage TFP into an aggregate TFP at facility level. In Table 12 we report these
two sets of weights for each stage of production. Two main messages emerge. First, the
contribution of production to overall facility-level efficiency increases as we move down-
stream. The weight on sintering productivity is 0.48 compared to weights of 0.8 and 1.0
on iron-making and steel production, respectively. Second, the two alternative weights are
similar in magnitude, which provides additional validation for our estimated elasticities. As
a result, the two sets of weights deliver similar estimates of TFP. The subsequent analysis
is based on the TFP estimates weighted by the elasticities.
We present estimates of facility-level productivity differentials by ownership in Table 13.
35Data on iron ore are reported on an annual basis and cover two-thirds of the firms in the production
data.
36In iron- and steel-making, however, our production function estimation already factors in the quality
of the key material inputs. In fact, controlling for input quality changes only slightly the magnitudes of
productivity differentials.
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Column (1) shows that private integrated facilities are on average 6.2 percent more pro-
ductive than the facilities in central SOEs, and are 2.3 percent more productive relative
to provincial SOEs. Two main messages emerge. First, the ordering of productivity by
ownership at the facility level follows that found in pig-iron making and steel making. This
implies that the sizeable productivity disadvantage of private facilities in sintering is more
than offset by their superiority in the two downstream stages of production. Second, the
magnitude of the private ownership premium in steel seems small by comparison with Hsieh
and Song (2015)’s recent estimate of 33 percent for 2007 for the manufacturing sector, but
more in line with Berkowitz et al. (2016), who find an average 8.2 percent productivity
premium of private firms relative to SOEs between 2003 and 2007.37
Care must be taken in interpreting our estimates however. First, in addition to the
likely productivity losses in sintering linked with sourcing difficulties in high-quality iron
ores, private facilities may face other constraints that impact their productivity relative to
state-owned facilities.38 Below, we examine the possible role of restrictions on how private
facilities expand. In a less constrained environment, the premium favoring private facilities
might be even larger. Second, with value added in the steel sector 25-30 percent of gross
output, even modest productivity differences of the sort we have estimated translate into
significant differences in profitability by ownership, which have wider implications.
2.4.5 The Larger, the Better?
We documented systematic differences in the size of integrated facilities by ownership:
SOEs in general operate much larger facilities. The scatter plot of TFP against facility
37Differences in these estimates may come from several sources: First, estimation of a value-added versus
gross-output production function. Although both value-added and gross-output based TFP indices provide
a measure of technological change, the two will not necessarily be the same (Balk (2009)). Second, differences
in assumptions relating to the underlying production technology, e.g. Cobb-Douglas versus CES versus
translog, may result in differences in estimated TFP and our productivity ranking. And third, some
estimates may only reflect within-sector variation, while others capture both within and between sector
differences.
38Rough calculations suggest that eliminating the premium of central state-owned facilities in sintering
would raise the premium of private facilities at the facility level by an additional 2-3 percentage points.
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size in Figure 18 demonstrates a negative relationship between the two for the full sample,
with the slope much steeper for private than state-owned facilities. To examine how TFP
differs systematically with facility size by ownership, we run regressions of TFP on facility
size that also include interaction terms of ownership dummies with facility size. Results
are provided in Table 13 column (2) and confirm the results of Figure 18. For central
state-owned facilities, size appears to have no significant effect on TFP. In sharp contrast,
for private facilities, and slightly less so for provincial state-owned facilities, productivity
of integrated facilities declines with size. The coefficient on the interaction term for private
facilities implies that with a doubling in size, their productivity declines by 13.6 percent
relative to central state-owned facilities.39 This has the effect of reducing the productivity
premium of these firms relative to central state-owned facilities at larger sizes.
To further illustrate how the productivity premium differs by size, and explore any
potential nonlinear relationships, we once again divide our sample into size quartiles and
estimate productivity differentials by ownership for each of the subsamples. Table 14 con-
firms that the productivity advantage of private integrated facilities declines remarkably
with size. Private facilities outperform central state-owned facilities by 32.7 percent and
provincial state-owned facilities by 7.9 percent when the facility size is below the 25th
percentile. These premiums are huge relative to the average premiums of 6.2 percent and
2.3 percent that we presented earlier. Clearly, a pooled-sample regression conceals any
heterogeneity that might be linked with the size of integrated facilities. The productivity
premium of private facilities remains positive but declines considerably in the second quar-
tile. For facilities between the median and 75th percentile, the ranking of TFP completely
flips: Central state-owned facilities demonstrate an absolute advantage in this quartile of
19.8 and 5.2 percent relative to private and provincial state-owned facilities, respectively.
In the largest quartile, private facilities once again exhibit a significant advantage in TFP
over the state-owned facilities, however this is tied to the operations of a single private in-
39Since the productivity of central state-owned facilities is not systematically related to size, this also
implies an absolute decline.
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tegrated facility. With output in the third size quartile nearly forty percent of the private
sector’s total steel production, the low relative productivity of these facilities drags down
considerably the private sector’s overall premium relative to the state-owned facilities.
2.4.5.1 The Internal Configuration of Integrated Facilities An integrated facil-
ity consists of sets of sintering machines, blast furnaces (pig-iron making) and basic oxygen
furnaces (steel making). As firms expand existing facilities, or build new ones, they can
manage the size of the equipment they use in each stage to obtain their desired output
capacity. In pig-iron, for example, they may decide to use two 400 m3 blast furnaces rather
than a single 800 m3 blast furnace. Similar options are available in the choice of sintering
machines for sintering and basic oxygen furnaces for steel making. Differences in the in-
ternal configuration of integrated facilities of private firms and SOEs may help explain the
systematic relationship between size and productivity of these two types of facilities.
To examine this relationship more fully, we first regress the number of equipment in an
integrated facility on log size and log size interacted with our ownership dummies for each
individual stage. Since the number of equipment is a count variable, we report results in
Table 15 using Poisson regression. Two findings emerge. First, when central state-owned
facilities expand, the absolute number of equipment drops in sintering and pig-iron making,
but increases in steel making. Second, doubling the size of private facilities is associated
with more machines/furnaces in all stages of production, both absolutely and relative to
state-owned facilities that expand at the same rate. In Table 16, we report related results
from the perspective of average equipment size. They tell a complementary story. As the
size of the integrated facility doubles, the average size of equipment in private facilities in
each stage of production increases, but increases less rapidly relative to central state-owned
facilities by 13.3 percentage points in sintering, 27.4 percentages points in pig-iron making
and 17 percentage points in steel making.
In short, as private firms try to expand their capacity, they install larger machines/furnaces,
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but more of them since their average machine/furnace size is smaller than SOEs. From
the perspective of Table 6, this difference is especially sharp in the third quartile for pig-
iron making, exactly the quartile in which private facilities do most poorly relative to the
state-owned facilities. And this pattern of internal organization helps to explain the falling
productivity premium of private integrated facilities.
2.4.5.2 Larger Equipment Size As suggested by Table 10, equipment-level TFP de-
clines with equipment size. In particular, equipment-level TFP in private facilities declines
relative to state-owned facilities as equipment size expands in all three production stages,
with the effect more pronounced (and statistically significant) in pig-iron and steel making.
Three channels combined may help to explain the falling equipment-level productivity
in private facilities in both absolute terms and relative to state-owned facilities when equip-
ment size increases. First, because of learning-by-doing effects associated with the use of
new technologies, larger furnaces may only achieve full production efficiency with added
years of operational experience. Li (2011) documents this phenomenon for Baosteel, widely
accepted as China’s most advanced steel maker. The decline in TFP with equipment size
in all ownership categories may reflect the learning-by-doing process required to master
fully the newly installed larger machines/furnaces in the industry.40
Second, rising equipment size requires better human capital both on the shop floor and
in management. Ahlbrandt et al. (1996) argue in the context of the US steel industry
that for any given level of technology, the best performing plants are those with the most
capable production workers. More generally, new technology and human capital are highly
complementary. Li (2011) points out, for example, that by design larger blast furnaces are
more advanced in their technology (e.g. energy saving and environmental friendly), and
also more demanding in the role of advanced management systems.41 In larger furnaces,
40However, our short panel cannot effectively show such learning-by-doing effect.
41Larger blast furnaces require managers to adopt modern management procedures, such as “PDCA”,
i.e. Plan, Do, Check and Action. As large blast furnaces also generate huge amounts of data, management
and analysis of data are critical for operating and control of large and modern blast furnace. See “High
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for example, workers must control the size, shape and temperature of the burdens fed into
furnaces within much finer tolerances, thereby putting a premium on higher quality shop-
floor workers.42 Last, large furnaces require additional care and maintenance: A temporary
breakdown lasting a single minute can result in substantial costs.
Third, much lower levels of human capital in private facilities may lead to the more
rapid drop-off in TFP as equipment size rises. In China’s steel sector 18.7 percent of
SOE employees had a college degree or higher compared to only 7.2 percent in private
firms. The percentage of skilled labor in SOEs was almost two and a half times larger
than in private firms (4.7 versus 2 percent).43 In general, SOEs provide better wage and
non-wage benefits (housing, pensions, child care and health care, etc) than private firms,
and thus are more attractive for more highly skilled workers. A vast literature documents
the earning gap between SOEs and non-state firms in urban China.44 Even though the
earnings premium of SOEs over private firms has declined over time, the premium was
still 24 percent in 2007 (De´murger et al. (2012)). The decomposition of earnings suggests
that observed differences in human capital, hours worked, etc. are only a small part of the
picture and that ownership differences unrelated to productivity are far more important.45
Lower levels of human capital in private firms likely increase the time needed to digest
new technology and prevent private facilities from fully exploiting the potential of such
technology. Hence, the lack of highly skilled managers and qualified workers could be one
explanation for the sharply falling TFP in larger private facilities.
Capacity Iron Making with Large, Modern Blast Furnaces”, International Conference on Emerging Trends
in Metals & Minerals Sector. New Delhi, 5 September 2014.
42In addition, in larger furnaces, the production process must be more carefully monitored to ensure that
slag is removed almost immediately because of the greater risk that it might clog the furnace as pressure
inside the furnace increases (Yao (2014)).
43The figures are based on the authors’ calculation using the 2004 Industrial Survey Data.
44See for example, Zhao (2002), Chen et al. (2005), De´murger et al. (2007), De´murger et al. (2012), Ge
and Yang (2010), Xia et al. (2013).
45The earning variable covers both wage and non-wage benefits and is adjusted to reflect differences in
regional cost of living.
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2.4.5.3 Coordination To operate integrated facilities, firms have to coordinate mul-
tiple machines/furnaces both within the same stage and across stages. Ahlbrandt et al.
(1996) point out that integrated plants incorporate a series of processes, which must be
compatible and coordinated in order to achieve maximum efficiency and quality. However,
coordinating changes in the work environment can be challenged by a series of practices
including training and team building, motivation and communication, and conflict resolu-
tion. Better management practices and more capable managers facilitate coordination and
thereby reduce coordination costs. We saw in the previous section that private facilities in
general face constraints on human capital. This situation may apply to managerial talent
as well. The lack of skilled managers likely induces additional coordination cost at the
expense of efficiency. Even if private facilities have as good managers as state-owned facil-
ities, the rising number of machines/furnaces as they expand spreads managerial resources
more thinly in private facilities, posing more challenges for coordination in multi-process
production.
To investigate how well the production stages are coordinated, we construct TFP cor-
relations between consecutive links along the production chain for each integrated facility.
In Table 17 we present TFP correlations by ownership and by facility size. Private facili-
ties display the highest TFP correlation across stages when facility size is below median.
However, when integrated facilities get larger, TFP correlation drops steadily in private
facilities. In sharp contrast, TFP tends to align much better across stages in larger state-
owned facilities. In short, the failure of the private facilities to align production efficiencies
across stages when they expand translates into a loss in facility-level TFP.
2.4.6 Why Are Private Facilities Smaller?
Over the period we analyze, the demand for steel grew rapidly, and steel firms of all own-
ership types had strong incentives to expand. With steel production exhibiting strong
increasing returns to scale at both the equipment- and facility-level, we expect expansion
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to be achieved through larger scales because of the falling long-run average cost. However,
our data show that private facilities are on average much smaller than state-owned facili-
ties, as are their machines/furnaces throughout the value chain. The internal configuration
of private facilities likely reflects a variety of constraints private firms face as they make
expansion plans. For private firms subject to constraints on expansion approval, finance,
human capital and iron ore quality, private firms are better off expanding in small scales
with relatively small machine/furnace size. A further reason to partially offset the expec-
tation for increasing equipment size is the added production flexibility afforded by having
smaller machines/furnaces.
2.4.6.1 Regulatory Constraints Rapid expansion of China’s steel sector in the last
two decades has been accompanied by an unexpected and unwelcomed outcome: massive
excess capacity. A major objective of the Chinese central government is to limit excessive
capacity, and more important, to restructure the industry around a few giant SOEs under
its direct supervision. This policy direction incentivizes firms that want to be significant
players in the industry to expand in order to avoid being acquired or possibly shut down.
However, government permission is essential for capacity expansion, approval that is much
harder for private firms than for SOEs. The regulatory constraints may prevent private
firms from expanding to a larger size.
Despite the central directive to limit capacity, there are cases in which firms expand
with cooperational support from local governments who are interested in promoting local
investment to improve their tax base and growth prospects. Nevertheless, private firms
that undergo large-scale expansion risk drawing public attention and becoming a target of
upper-level regulatory agencies. A well-known example is Tieban Steel, a private firm in
the province of Jiangsu. The firm’s owner was imprisoned for carrying out a large-scale
project that expanded the firm’s capacity by 8 million tons against the wishes of the central
government. To avoid detection, Tieben took advantage of a regulatory loophole and split
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the expansion into several smaller projects that installed smaller machines/furances in
several phases. Although Tieben ultimately failed, its case illustrates the role of regulatory
constraints in limiting the size of facilities built by private firms.
2.4.6.2 Capital Constraints Capital constraints could also result in smaller scales for
private firms. A sizeable investment is required to install an integrated facility. The invest-
ment cost of a single large machine/furnace is also substantially larger than multiple smaller
machines/furnaces with equal total capacity. In Table 18, we report the investment cost
per unit of capacity by furnace size. Using blast furnaces for iron-making as an example,
installing two 500m3 furnaces rather than a single furnace of 1000m3 saves approximately
4.5 million US dollars, or 7-8% of total investment.46 In theory, the increasing returns to
scale should provide a strong motive for firms to install larger machines/furnaces. However,
it is widely documented that private firms in China are discriminated against in the credit
market.47 Hence, private firms face a trade-off between enjoying lower long-run average
costs by bearing the immediate higher investment cost and making less-costly investments.
The financing constraints likely steer private firms towards smaller machines/furnaces.
2.4.6.3 Human Capital Constraints A growing body of literature and stylized facts
demonstrate the effect of firm ownership on firms’ capability in accessing resources and
capital. Drawing on a sample of private enterprises in China, Garnaut et al. (2012) argue
that private firms are not only financially constrained, but are also constrained in other
areas such as human capital.48 Iskandar (2015) uses the World Bank 2012 survey data to
provide evidence that private firms are human capital constrained in terms of skilled and
trained labor force. The steel industry is no exception. As we described earlier, compared
46The figures are based on an internal report prepared by the Chinese Metallurgy Planning Institute in
August 2016 for the authors.
47Among many others, Brandt and Li (2003); Poncet et al. (2010); Guariglia et al. (2011); Cull et al.
(2015).
48The four surveyed cities include Beijing, Chengdu, Chengde and Wenzhou.
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to private firms, SOEs had a larger fraction of employees with college degree and above, and
more skilled labor as well. Thus, smaller machines/furnaces are more compatible with the
managerial talent, organizational capabilities and skill sets that private firms have, and
private firms are better off with smaller machines/furnaces conditional on the available
resources of human capital. On the other hand, larger machines/furnaces require more
talented and experienced managers as well as higher skill workers, which SOEs likely have
in more abundance.49
2.4.6.4 Raw Material Constraints As is evidenced in Figure 19, the iron ore that
smaller furnaces use covers a much wide range of grades than larger furnaces which only
use high grade ore. Larger furnaces are substantially more demanding in the quality of raw
materials due to their structural features. As to private firms, access to only lower grade
iron ores and greater flexibility of smaller furnaces with respect to iron ore choice may
predispose them towards smaller units, which are a better fit for private firms in terms of
the raw materials that they are able to obtain.
2.4.6.5 Production Flexibility Even in the context of a long-run increase in the de-
mand for steel, short-run fluctuations are likely. To take full advantage of the opportunities
in a booming market, firms need to be able to expand capacity quickly, and fully utilize
existing capacity. In contrast, in periods of contraction, firms need to be able to adjust
production and shut down plants quickly.
Larger furnaces take longer to build. This introduces additional uncertainties and may
even pull down expected returns as firms run the risk of missing out on a boom market.
In addition, the time (and therefore costs) it takes to start up or shut down a furnace
also increases with size. This makes it much more difficult for a large furnace to adjust to
demand shocks in the short run. By contrast, firms with several smaller furnaces can adjust
49Several studies have also shown that state-owned firms in China hold aside large human resource
inventories (e.g. Peng and Heath (1996); Tan (2003)).
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productions more gradually and in a more timely way by simply suspending operations in
a subset of their furnaces. Similarly, as the market recovers and steel prices increases, small
furnaces can respond more quickly.
Since January 2016, steel prices have recovered from their lows in 2015. By April 2016,
40-50 million tons of steel capacity–mostly in private firms–were estimated to have resumed
production, which represents more than 70% of the idle capacity in 2015.50 Big SOEs, on
the other hand, were not able to ramp up production using idle capacity in time to take
advantage of the rising prices. Larger blast furnaces require more thorough inspections
and replacement of key components before they can be safely restarted. The entire process
not only takes two to four weeks, but entails sizable costs, which keeps the big SOEs from
adjusting production flexibly.
2.5 DISCUSSION
2.5.1 Measurement Error in Capital
Capacity alone may not fully capture the variations in capital, which could result in a bias
in our productivity estimates. Investment cost per unit capacity, which we assume as fixed
cost, for example, increases with equipment size.51 The potential bias results from two
sources. First, the positive correlation between capacity and unit investment cost leads to
an upward bias in capital coefficients. Second, estimated productivity contains the unit
price of capacity. Other things equal, the overestimate of the capital stock in private
facilities would lead to a downward bias in the productivity differentials that we found in
pig-iron and steel making.
The following proof formalizes our argument. To simplify the exposition, we omit
50http://news.cqcoal.com/a/xinwenzixun/jinriguanzhu/2016/0427/65557.html
51We extract the information on investment costs of steel plants from an internal report prepared by the
Chinese Metallurgy Planning Institute in August 2016 per the authors’ request.
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stage subscript s and time subscript t. Let us rewrite the production function using price-
adjusted capital k∗, consisting of unit capacity price p and capacity k, the capital measure
that we use in our baseline estimation.
yi = αli + βk
∗
i + γri + ωi + i
= αli + βki + γri + βpi + ωi + i
In our baseline model, we treat unit capacity price p as measurement error, so our estimated
productivity is equal to βˆpi + ωˆi. First, unit capacity price p is positively correlated with
capacity k, which will lead to a potential upward bias in the estimated parameter on
capital β. Second, our measure of productivity (βˆpi + ωˆi) includes the unobserved unit
capacity price, which would potentially bias the ownership differentials in productivity.
Let us consider the estimated productivity differential between equipment in private and
central state-owned facilities, i.e., βˆ(pprivatei − pcentrali ) + (ωˆprivatei − ωˆcentrali ). The first
term reflects capacity price difference, and the second measures the true difference in
productivity. As private facilities systematically operate smaller equipment than central
state-owned facilities, unit capacity price of private machines/furnaces is generally lower.
Consequently, the first term of the productivity differential is negative, which gives rise to
a downward bias in the estimated productivity premium of private equipment as opposed
to equipment at central state-owned facilities.
We use the price information on investment of basic oxygen furnaces (steel making)
in Table 18 to adjust capital, and re-estimate the production function for steel using this
adjusted capital measure. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 19. Compared
to the baseline estimation, using the adjusted capital generates a lower coefficient for
capital, as predicted. We report the corresponding productivity differentials in Table 20.
The productivity premium of private furnaces relative to central state-owned furnaces rises
from 5.8 percent to 7.5 percent when we base our estimates on the price-adjusted capital,
an increase in relative TFP of nearly thirty percent.
Independent of furnace size, systematic differences may also exist in the costs per unit
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of capacity between private and state-owned facilities. In general, we expect private firms
to be more cost sensitive, and for them to be successful in finding ways to build furnaces of
any size at lower cost, and thus enjoy lower per unit cost of capacity relative to SOEs. This
source of measurement error would further underestimate productivity premiums of private
facilities. Similar to our discussion about the bias generated by ignoring the increasing unit
cost of capacity with equipment size, there will be an effect coming through our estimate
of the elasticity for capital, and our estimate of the capital stock of these private facilities.
Additional information on capacity cost by ownership is needed to estimate the magnitude
of this bias.
2.5.2 Measurement Error in Output
From Table 21 we know that private facilities produce consistently lower quality output
in each production stage. As to output quality, we observe qualification rates of sinter,
pig-iron and steel. In addition, stability rates of sinter and shares of premium iron are
reported. Shares of secondary steel making provides additional evidence on the quality
of steel. Output is measured in physical units in our data set, obscuring output quality
differences between facilities, which could bias the productivity estimates. To simplify the
exposition, we omit stage and time subscripts.
y∗i (yi, Xi) = f(li, ki, ri) + ωi + i (2.6)
where y∗ measures the quality-adjusted output, defined as a function of the observed output
y and X, a vector of output quality measures. f is a general production function and is
stage-specific but time-invariant. Assume that y and the quality components are additively
separable.
y∗i = yi + δ(Xi) (2.7)
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Substitute (Equation 2.7) into (Equation 2.6) generates the baseline production function
that we estimated.
yi = f(li, ki, ri) + (ωi − δ(Xi)) + i (2.8)
Hence the estimated productivity ˆωi − δ(Xi) also incorporates output quality.
To see how output quality affects productivity differentials by ownership, we re-estimate
the facility-level productivity differentials by controlling the quality of each output. Ta-
ble 22 shows that productivity premium of private facilities relative to central state-owned
facilities drops slightly when we control for output quality, from 6.2 percent to 5.7 per-
cent. And the premium relative to provincial state-owned facilities experiences a more
pronounced change, declining from 2.3 percent to less than 1 percent. The shrinking pre-
miums suggest that state-owned facilities produce higher quality output at the expense of
productivity.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Prior productivity studies often focus on firm level due to data limitations. This chapter
is one of the first to study the underlying sources of productivity differences by production
facilities’ ownership structure through the lens of facilities’ internal configuration. The
new data set that we construct provides equipment-level information on inputs and output
in physical units for each link in the value chain of vertically-integrated facilities. The
richness of our data allow us to measure the physical efficiency of producers at integrated
facility level, and more important, to decompose differences in performance by ownership
type into process (stage) and equipment level differences, thereby providing new insight
into the internal dimensions of complex industrial operations.
We find that private facilities are on average 6.2 percent more productive than central
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state-owned facilities, and 2.3 percent relative to provincial state-owned facilities. Adjust-
ing for capital cost and product quality differences lead to minor changes in productivity
premiums. The magnitude of the private ownership premium in steel seems small by
comparison with prior studies on the productivity differences by ownership in China’s
manufacturing industries. Among others, the gaps leave a caveat for future research on
productivity that one needs to interpret more carefully productivity estimates which may
pick up serious measurement errors. Breaking down the facility level productivity, we find
that this ranking lines up with our productivity estimates in the two downstream produc-
tion stages, but central state-owned facilities outperform in sintering, which may be linked
with their superior access to higher quality raw materials.
The internal configuration of the integrated facilities provide further sources to under-
stand the productivity differences between facilities. Private facilities expand by adding
more but smaller machines/furnaces, which potentially reflects various constraints that
they are facing. As a result, the productivity advantage of private facilities declines with
their size, turning negative for facilities larger than the median. Underlying the decision
of private firms to build relatively smaller machines/furnaces as they expand are several
factors including tighter restrictions on equipment size and investment, difficulty in access-
ing higher quality raw materials and human capital, and possibly credit constraints. Our
analysis suggests that the productivity advantage of private facilities would be significantly
higher if the constraints were removed. For example, rough calculations suggest that elim-
inating the premium of central state-owned facilities in sintering would raise the premium
of private facilities by an additional 2 to 3 percentage points.
In this chapter we have focused largely on the constraints facing private firms in their
choice of machine/furnace size. As discussed in section 2.4.6.3, there are also likely some
advantages to having a portfolio of machines/furnaces with smaller average size. In order
to examine these trade-offs more carefully, we need to build and estimate a structural
dynamic model that looks at the role of both demand and supply side considerations in
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the firm’s choices. This will entail incorporating into a dynamic model of investment the
various constraints that we identified facing firms of different ownership type. We will also
need to model the demand side, the fluctuations of which also likely play an important
role in shaping firms’ decisions on internal configuration. Access to several more years of
firm-level data will facilitate model identification by providing data that spans both booms
and contractions in China’s steel market.
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3.0 FINANCING CONSTRAINTS IN CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE
MANUFACTURING SECTOR
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Finance sector plays an important role in economic growth (e.g., Schumpeter (1961), King
and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)). The presence of financing constraints
hampers the development of an economy through resource misallocation across firms. The
extent of financing constraints and its impact on firms’ investment decisions are heated
topics in the corporate finance literature.1 Financing constraints are considered as one of
the primary obstacles to firms’ investment.
Developing countries in general bear more institutional imperfections than developed
countries; with weaker financial systems, their firms face more severe financing constraints.
To what extent are firms financially constrained in China, the world’s largest transition
economy? Does the preferential treatment for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still exclude
China’s private sector from formal credit allocation?
China has enjoyed impressive growth for over thirty years since the launch of the Eco-
nomic Reform and Opening Policy in the late 1970s. The reform era witnessed a dramatic
decline of the state sector and a rise of the non-state sector. The share of SOEs in indus-
trial output and industrial employment amounted to 78% and 76% respectively in 1978,
1To list a few, Fazzari et al. (1988), Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Love (2003), Harrison and
McMillan (2003), and Harrison et al. (2004), etc.
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and the state sector absorbed 84% of investment during 1975-1980.2 However, the shares
in industrial output and employment plummeted to 12.2% and 10.3% in 2010 for the state
sector, whereas the corresponding shares of the private sector shot up to 30.5% and 34.7%
in the same year.3 The swift emergence of the private sector is largely due to the entry per-
mission rendered by the reform to firms of all ownerships in many different sectors that had
been exclusive for SOEs. Furthermore, the political support of privatization of small SOEs
and ownership restructuring of large SOEs in the 1990s deepened the economic reform to
a great extent (Bu¨chelhofer (2008)). Consequently, the number of industrial enterprises
soared from 936,000 in 1980 to 7.34 million in 1995 (Brandt and Rawski (2008)) and 7.93
million in 1999 (China Statistical Year Book, 2000).4
Despite an increasingly important role the private sector plays in the Chinese economy,
the preferential treatment for SOEs still prevails in various aspects and hampers the growth
of the economy. That private firms are discriminated against SOEs in China in terms of
credit allocation dates back to the extremely repressed financial system in the central
planning era. Despite a structural change in the financial sector that took place between
1978 and 1984 (Allen et al. (2008)), a price ceiling was imposed on both lending and
deposit rates to keep interest rates at a low level to direct capital into the state-owned
sector (Chan et al. (2012)). Lending quotas issued by the four state-owned commercial
banks were distributed among state-owned firms based on the investment plans and funding
requests they submitted.5 Private firms, nonetheless, were excluded from lending quotas.
Furthermore, there was a legal bias against private firms which made assets collateralization
harder, thereby banks found it riskier to lend to private firms (Huang (2002)). Even though
the financial liberalization took place in the late 1990s, the “political pecking order” of firms
continues as a major obstacle to channeling resources to the most efficient firms.
2Data source: Fifty years, 2000, p.18,21,58, cited by Brandt et al. (2008).
3The calculation is based on data reported in China Statistical Year Book 2011.
4From 2001 on, China Statistical Year Book only reports numbers of above-scale industrial firms.
5The Bank of China, China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial bank of China, and the
Agricultural Bank of China.
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In spite of a market-oriented financial reform, it is widely accepted that the private
sector is still subject to tremendous constraints compared to its state counterpart. Based
on a survey that covers over 10,000 firms in eighty-one countries, Batra et al. (2003) find
that private firms in China are the most constrained in the world with respect to their
access to capital. Brandt and Li (2003) examine bank discrimination against private firms
in China and find that access to working capital is difficult for private firms, which results
in an inefficient allocation of credits. Haggard and Huang (2008) provide survey evidence
suggesting that restrictive access to formal financial credits makes Chinese private firms
resort to informal funds. He´ricourt and Poncet (2009) illustrate that as financial reform
deepens in China, the FDI inflow alleviates financing constraint for private firms. Poncet
et al. (2010) find that Chinese private firms are credit constrained while state-owned firms
are not.
Furthermore, the presence of foreign capital alleviates the level of constraints faced
by private firms. Chan et al. (2012) investigate the impact of recent financial reforms in
China on the financing constraints and investment behaviors of size-dependent publicly-
listed Chinese firms. They find that large firms are not financing constrained but small
firms display significant constraints. However, as financial reform takes place, large firms -
mostly state-owned - become more financing constrained since their preferential treatment
is gradually eliminated; little change has been witnessed for the small firms.
So far, existing studies have relied on information of either publicly-listed firms or sur-
veys of certain geographic region covering short time periods; evidence based on the small
coverage of firms would reveal a partial picture therefore could lead to biased conclusions.
Unlike earlier studies, I use the Chinese Industrial Survey Data that cover all the above-
scale manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007 to measure the level of financing constraints
in China’s state and private sectors.6 In addition, this chapter breaks down the analyses
to different economic regions and industries. The empirical framework builds on an Euler
6The above scale firms refer to all the SOEs and non-state firms with annual sales above 5 million RMB.
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equation approach where the level of financing constraints is captured by the stochastic
ratio of shadow costs of external finance tomorrow to today. Particularly, two firm-level
financial factors are introduced to explicitly proxy the level of financing constraints, i.e.
interest coverage and debt to asset ratios.
Applying dynamic GMM estimation, I find that SOEs, overall, are slightly financing
constrained whereas private firms do face much greater obstacles in accessing credit. How-
ever, contrary to the widely accepted view that China’s private sector is largely excluded
from formal credit allocation, I find that large firms are not credit constrained even if they
are privately owned. Since firm size is positively correlated with firm performance in the
private sector, this result sheds light on the transition of the Chinese banking system and
provides evidence of increasingly commercial bank behavior.
Another possible explanation relates to the origins of large private firms. The recent
astonishing emergence of the private sector, especially large-scale private firms, implies
that these firms have high likelihood to possess political connections, which facilitate easy
access to credit. With regard to medium and small firms, SOEs are financially constrained,
although to an extent less than their private counterparts. Therefore, over the course of
development, not only ownership but firm size shapes the structure of credit allocation.
Furthermore, this chapter illustrates that there is cross-regional variation in accessing
external finance. The east and coastal region is the most financially constrained region
among the four (east and coastal, northeast, middle and west) regions, which is largely due
to the constrained private firms in the region. In addition, cross-sector analysis demon-
strates that high-tech firms do not display any financing constraints at all, whereas in other
industries, medium and small firms suffer from credit distortion with private firms being
constrained to a greater degree than SOEs. The tilt toward the high-tech sector is largely
in line with the economic policy on industrial upgrading launched by the Chinese central
government. This finding partly demonstrates policy-makers’ recognition of the role the
private sector plays in the economy in transition.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a structural investment model
based on firm’s dynamic optimization problem, characterizes the econometric specification,
and discusses estimation issues. Section 3.3 provides a detailed data description followed
by an illustration of main results in section 3.4. Section 3.5 is devoted to limitations and
extensions, and section 3.6 draws conclusions.
3.2 METHODOLOGY
3.2.1 Euler Equation Approach
In this section, following Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Love (2003) and Harrison
and McMillan (2003), I lay out a dynamic structural model of investment to describe firms’
optimization problem. In this model, together with an equity constraint, I also introduce
a debt constraint to take into account a complete scope of financing constraints firms face.
A firm i is assumed to maximize the present market value of its expected net dividend
streams by choosing variable inputs Nit and investments Iit at the beginning of every period
t. Without loss of generality, Iit is assumed to be immediately productive. However, a
strictly convex adjustment cost is incurred when firms add new capital. At the same
time, firms realize borrowing Bit while paying back previous period’s debt Bi,t−1 at the
interest rate ii,t−1. Inflation rate is denoted as pit, depreciation rate δ, and βti,t+j is the
discount factor for period t+j. F (Kit, Nit) is the production function for gross output,
where Kit represents capital stock at period t. G(Kit, Iit) characterizes the adjustment
cost of investment, which reflects, for example, the installation cost of a new machine.
Furthermore, let pit denote firm specific output price, p
I
it the price of investment goods,
wt the price of variable inputs. D¯it is the firm- and time-varying lower limit on dividends,
and B¯it represents the firm- and time-varying borrowing constraint the firm faces. For
simplicity assume there is no imposition of tax in the economy. Under these assumptions,
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the firm’s objective function becomes:
MaxEt[
∞∑
j=0
βti,t+jDi,t+j(Ki,t+j , Ni,t+j , Ii,t+j)] (3.1)
subjects to four constraints below:
• Capital stock evolution
Kit = (1− δ)Ki,t−1 + Iit (3.2)
• Definition of firm’s dividend
Dit = pitF (Kit, Nit)− pIitIit − wtNit − pitG(Kit, Iit) +Bit−
it−1Bi,t−1 − (1− pit)Bi,t−1 (3.3)
• Borrowing constraint
Bit ≤ B¯it (3.4)
• Dividend constraint
Dit ≥ D¯it (3.5)
Note that equations (3.4) and (3.5) capture the constraints the firm faces on external
finance. First order conditions with respect to Kit, Iit and Bit generate the following
equations, where the Lagrangian multipliers θit, γit, λit are associated with constraints
(3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) respectively. In particular, λit can be interpreted as the shadow cost
of raising new equity.
Kit : (1 + λit)(
∂D
∂K
)it = θit − (1− δ)βti,t+1Et(θi,t+1) (3.6)
Iit : (
∂D
∂K
)it + λit(
∂D
∂I
)it + θit = 0 (3.7)
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Bit : −γit + (1 + λit) + βti,t+1Et[(pit − 1− it)(1 + λi,t+1)] = 0 (3.8)
Combining equation (3.6) and (3.7) delivers the Euler equation:
(
∂D
∂K
)it + (
∂D
∂I
)it = (1− δ)βti,t+1Et[
1 + λi,t+1
1 + λit
(
∂D
∂I
)i,t+1] (3.9)
Equation (3.8) indicates that a binding debt constraint will affect the expected intertem-
poral transfer of resources. However, as debt enters the dividend function separately, the
debt constraint does not affect the Euler equation (3.9) (Whited and Wu (2006)). Fur-
thermore, since both λit and γit are unobservable and are likely to be affected by the same
set of observable variables, it is difficult to identify the two separately. To address this
issue, I follow the approach of Whited and Wu (2006) to focus on the identification of the
Lagrange multiplier λit associated with dividend constraint via the Euler equation (3.9).
The left-hand side of the Euler equation represents marginal cost of investment today net
of marginal increase in output; the right-hand side reads as the present value of expected
marginal cost of postponing investment till tomorrow. When the constraint (3.8) doesn’t
bind, no wedge would appear between the opportunity costs of investment today and to-
morrow, i.e.
1+λi,t+1
1+λit
= 1. Under circumstances of financing constraints, however, a higher
shadow cost of today λi,t will drive up the opportunity cost of investing today, therefore
generate a lower
1+λi,t+1
1+λit
. Firms then would rather substitute tomorrow’s investment for
today’s. Therefore, the term
1+λi,t+1
1+λit
in Euler equation (3.9) captures the level of financing
constraints. Define Λit ≡ 1− 1+λi,t+11+λit : the more financially constrained, the higher Λit the
firm carries. Equation (3.10) is written as below:
(1− δ)βti,t+1Et[(1− Λit)(
∂D
∂I
)i,t+1] = (
∂D
∂K
)it + (
∂D
∂I
)it (3.10)
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3.2.2 Parameterization
3.2.2.1 Adjustment Costs I follow Bond and Meghir (1994) in applying a sym-
metric adjustment cost function which is linearly homogenous in investment and capital,
G(Iit,Kit) =
1
2bKit[Iit/Kit − c]2. Therefore the derivatives of dividends with respect to I
and K are presented as below:
(
∂D
∂I
)it = −bαpit( I
K
)it + bcαpit − pIit (3.11)
(
∂D
∂K
)it = αpit(
Y
K
)it − αpit( ∂F
∂N
N
K
)it + bαpit(
I
K
)2it − bcαpit(
I
K
)it (3.12)
where Yit = Fit − Git denotes net output and α = 1 − (1/) > 0, where  is the constant
price elasticity of demand under the assumption of imperfect competition. Y is further
assumed to be linearly homogeneous in K and L. Moreover, without explicitly specifying
a production function form, the marginal product of variable costs ∂F∂N is assumed to be
replaced by wt/αpit.
3.2.2.2 Linearization Following Love (2003), I linearize the term (1 − Λit)(∂D∂I )i,t+1
around mean values, yielding the following approximation:
(1− Λit)(∂D
∂I
)i,t+1 ≈ −φΛit + a(∂D
∂I
)i,t+1 + φ(1− a) (3.13)
where by assumption a refers to the mean of (1 − Λit), φ is the mean of (∂D∂I )i,t+1 across
firms over time. Furthermore, under the assumption of rational expectations, the stochas-
tic term on the left-hand side of equation (3.10) is replaced with realized future values plus
an error term vit, which is assumed to be orthogonal to all the current-period variables.
Substituting (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.10) generates the following form:
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(
I
K
)i,t+1 =
(1 + c)Φt+1
a
(
I
K
)it−Φt+1
a
(
I
K
)2it−
Φi,t+1(α− 1)
abα
(
Y
K
)it−Φi,t+1
baα
(
CF
K
)it+
Φi,t+1
bα
Uit
− φ
abαpi,t+1
Λit + (1− Φi,t+1
a
)c+
1− a
αapi,t+1
+ vit
(3.14)
where Φi,t+1 =
pit
pi,t+1
1
βti,t+1(1−δ)
, (CFK )it =
pitYit−wtNit
pitKit
is the ratio of real cash flow to capital
stock. The Uit =
pIt
pt
[1/a − p
I
t+1β
t
t+1(1−δ)
pIt
] is defined as user cost of capital. In particular,
we impose φ to be non-positive, which implies the average (∂Π∂I )t is driven negative due
to the existence of capital adjustment cost and the unit cost of investment. The positive
correlation between financial factors and future investment simply justifies the argument
that the more financially constrained, the more likely firms would postpone their investment
till tomorrow.
3.2.2.3 Financing Constraints I follow Whited (1992) to measure Λit with two firm-
level financial factors, the ratio of total debt to total assets (DAR) and the ratio of interest
to the sum of interest and cash flow, which is referred to as interest coverage (COV).
Under the constrained circumstance, these financial factors would have a positive impact
on future investment, since firms substitute investment tomorrow for today. In a word,
the more constrained are firms today, the more likely they are willing to postpone their
investment activities till tomorrow. The function of Λt adopts the linear form:
Λit = c(DARit, COVit) ≈ c0 + c1DARit + c2COVit (3.15)
Moreover, the sensitivity of investment on cash flow can be drawn on as a complementary
but rather indirect indicator of how difficult firms obtain external finance (e.g.,Bond and
Meghir (1994)).
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3.2.3 Empirical Model and Identification
I follow Bond and Meghir (1994) by assuming the real discount rate term Φit, price pit
and the coefficients on the right-hand side terms to be constant across firms and over time.
Furthermore, I introduce time fixed effects and firm fixed effects to control for the varia-
tion in the user cost of capital term and the potential yearly macroeconomic shocks that
hit the firm. Substituting equation (3.15) into (3.14), I arrive at the empirical specification:
(
I
K
)it = β1(
I
K
)i,t−1 + β2(
I
K
)2i,t−1 + β3(
Y
K
)i,t−1 + β4(
CF
K
)i,t−1+
β5COVi,t−1 + β6DARi,t−1 + dt + it (3.16)
where it = si + vit, CF = cash flow, Y = sales, dt = time fixed effects, si = firm fixed
effects and vi,t = error term. We expect the signs of β5, β6 and (or) β4 to be positive for
the financially constrained firms.
3.2.3.1 Identification Issues The first issue in estimation concerns the presence of
firm fixed effects. Since the lagged variable ( IK )i,t−1 is correlated with the firm fixed effects
si, which gives rise to dynamic panel bias (Nickell (1981)), OLS would generate inconsistent
estimators. One prevalent way to work out this endogeneity problem is to conduct first-
difference transformation to take out the fixed effects. However, the endogeneity problem
still remains since E[∆( IK )i,t−1∆it] 6= 0. To further resolve the issue, one way could be
applying the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) where differenced
lagged dependent variable ∆( IK )i,t−1 is instrumented with t-2 and further lags, assuming
no presence of autocorrelation among the error terms. If there’s AR(q) in it, levels of
endogenous variables dated at t-q-2 and further are taken as instruments. As Roodman
(2006) points out, compared to the one-step GMM estimator, the two-step estimator is
efficient and robust to whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity. As the data I use cover
large numbers of firms over ten years and across thirty 2-digit industries, it is likely to have
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the presence of heteroskedasticity among observations. Therefore, I resort to the two-step
estimator.
As demonstrated by Blundell and Bond (1998), if the dependent variable I/K is close
to a random walk, then Arellano-Bond first-difference GMM estimator performs poorly
because past levels shed little light on future changes, therefore untransformed lags are
weak instruments for transformed variables. Blundell and Bond (1998) prove that under
the assumption that changes in any instrumenting variable are uncorrelated with the fixed
effects, i.e.,E[∆( IK )i,t−1it] 6= 0, ∆( IK )i,t−1 is a valid instrument for ( IK )i,t−1. Again, if
there’s AR(q) in it, ∆(
I
K )i,t−q−1 are taken as the instruments. I apply Blundell and
Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator. In particular, because of serial correlation
mentioned above, levels of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-3 are used as instruments for first-
difference equations and first differences of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-2 are for level
equations.7
While I/K is inevitably correlated with the firm fixed effects, CF/K, Y/K, COV , DAR
can be potentially correlated with si as well (Bond and Meghir (1994)). On the other
hand, the rational expectation error vit is orthogonal to any information at the time when
the investment decision is made. I assume that all the regressors other than (I/K)i,t−1
in the Euler equation are not predetermined. In so doing, the strict exogeneity enables
(CF/K)i,t−1, (Y/K)i,t−1, COVi,t−1 and DARi,t−1 to be standard instruments for the first
difference equation. I also include industry dummies and time dummies as additional
instruments.
To test overidentification restrictions of the model, I use Hansen J statistics. In terms of
standard errors, the standard formula for the variance of linear GMM estimates can produce
downward-biased results when the number of instruments is large, which makes two-step
GMM useless for inference (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Windmeijer (2005) devises a
finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix that generates more accurate
7I report Arellano and Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests statistics to show that AR(1) is present in all the
regressions while AR(2) do not exist.
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inferences.
3.3 DATA ON CHINESE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
3.3.1 Data
I use panel data from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production that span 1998 to 2007
for all the above-scale industrial firms in China.8 The surveys are conducted by the Chinese
National Bureau of Statistics.9 The data form an unbalanced panel, with firms entering
and exiting every year. The survey includes mining, manufacturing and public utilities.
My study focuses on the manufacturing sector mainly for two reasons. First, the manufac-
turing sector plays an influential role in the Chinese economy. During the period 2005 to
2009, the sector accounted for 33.03% of national GDP per annum; during 2005 to 2010, the
average share of manufacturing goods in merchandise exports amounted to 93%.10 Second,
the focus on the manufacturing sector allows a more accurate assessment of financing con-
straints across state-owned firms and private firms. This is because the excluded industries
(petroleum and natural gas extraction, electricity and heating production and supply, wa-
ter production and supply, etc) are mostly government controlled oligopolies that possess
strong power over resources, including financial resources. Consequently, incorporating the
entire industries are very likely to bias the true levels of financing constraints.
3.3.1.1 Industry Classification The manufacturing sector consists of thirty 2-digit
industries in the data. Each firm is classified into an industry following the 4-digit Chinese
Industry Classification System that resembles the old U.S. SIC system. In the empirical
8Each survey round covers all the state-owned firms plus non-state firms with annual sales above 5
million RMB ($ 728,000), which are referred to as above-scale firms.
9Hereafter, I shall refer to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics as NBS.
10Data source: World Deveopment Indicators(database), World Bank, DC (accessed 2010),
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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analysis, I follow the 2-digit industry classification to reduce the number of industries to a
tractable level. In 2003, the classification system was revised to merge some sectors while
incorporating more details for other sectors. I follow Brandt et al. (2012) to construct a
consistent classification for years prior and post 2003. I provide detailed information on
the industry classification in the Appendix Table A7.
3.3.1.2 Ownership and Size Classification I follow Jefferson et al. (2003) and
Brandt et al. (2012) to utilize information on a firm’s registration type to categorize own-
ership. Specifically, there are 23 registration types, which are regrouped into six types in
my study: state-owned, collective, private, HMT (Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) and
others.1112 A sector-wide criterion set up by the NBS is used to classify firm size. Firms
with annual sales above 400 million RMB and total employment no less than 1,000 are
characterized as large; those with annual sales between 20 million RMB and 400 million,
employment between 300 and 1,000 are classified as medium (see Table 23). Failure to meet
either the annual sales or employment criteria would push the firm into a lower category.
3.3.1.3 Capital Stock and Investment Firms do not report fixed investment di-
rectly. Rather, each firm reports the value of fixed assets at original purchase prices as
well as their fixed assets at original purchase prices less accumulated depreciation, defined
as net value of fixed assets in the data set. The value of fixed assets include all the unde-
preciated capital stock at original purchase prices, therefore the net value of fixed assets
is not an ideal measure for capital stock. Following Brandt et al. (2012), I implement the
perpetual inventory method to construct capital stock. In addition, annual investment is
measured as changes of fixed assets at original purchase prices between years.
11Collective-owned firms are referred to as economic units where the assets are owned collectively.
12One limitation associated with the provided classification is that as long as a firm is kept track of
by the same ID, changes in ownership can not be captured. Considering that the ownership classification
criterion set by the NBS involves several ambiguous elements that can hardly be identified by the available
information in the data set, I stick to previous literature using the same data set to carry out ownership
classification. Detailed information is provided in the Appendix A.3.1.
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3.3.2 Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Sector
3.3.2.1 Size and Ownership Distribution With the launch of the economic reform
in China, the entry threshold was significantly lowered for the non-state sector, which led
to a pronounced increase in firm numbers. On the whole, active firms in the manufacturing
sector rose from 149,693 to 312,930 over ten years. Figure 20 illustrates that firm number
increases steadily from 1998 to 2003 while the following year witnesses a significant jump.
A slight drop follows afterwards, which is ended immediately by an upsurge in the last two
years in the sample at a higher rate than that from 1998 to 2003. The evolution varies by
ownership, however. In contrast to a nationwide boom, the state sector suffers a decline in
the number of active firms.
Table 24 reports firm distribution by size and ownership in 1998 and 2007 respectively.
First, small firms stand out in terms of firm number across ownerships and over time. Sec-
ond, the number state-owned firms shrank in all size over 1998-2007, whereas the number
private firms grew significantly. The most striking change occurs in small firms: there were
only 7.9 percent private firms in 1998, and the share reached 55.4 percent in 2007.
3.3.2.2 Aggregate Efficiency and Firm Performance Figure 21 illustrates the
evolution of capital productivity over 1998 and 2007, i.e. output per unit of capital.
Output(Q) is measured as value added and capital stock as net value of fixed assets.13
Figure 21 reports full sample results as well as the patterns for state and private firms
separately. Overall, the manufacturing sector experienced a steady gain in efficiency over
the ten years. The capital efficiency more than doubled from 1998 to 2007. By ownership,
the capital efficiency of private firms was three folds that of SOEs in 1998. While the
capital efficiency grew at an average rate of 6.40% per annum in the private sector, it grew
13All the values that I use in my calculation and the following regressions are deflated by
treating 1998 as the base year. I extracted the output and input deflators from NBS and
used the capital goods deflators constructed by Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski, downloaded at
http://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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more rapidly in the state sector at 11.43%.14 Even so, private firms remained more efficient
than their state-owned counterparts in 2007.
With respect to firm-level performance, I follow Jefferson et al. (2003) to present prof-
itability and export intensity across firm ownership (see Table 25).15 Profitability experi-
enced a rise on the whole regardless of firm size and ownership. A striking feature is that
negative profitability prevailed among state-owned medium and small firms. Clearly, state-
owned firms do not necessarily shut down even though they are not profitable anymore.
Export intensity reveals that private firms are more export oriented than state-owned firms
regardless of firm size.16 Overall, private firms perform better than state-owned ones.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 26 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables in the empirical analysis.
Column (1) (3) and (5) report the full sample summary statistics, and column (2) (4)
and (6) are for the trimmed sample at 1 percentile level at both tails. First, standard
deviations for all the variables in the full sample are extremely high. For example, the
absolute value of mean investment-to-capital ratio (I/K) in the pooled sample of SOEs
and private firms (column (1)) is 0.56. However, the corresponding standard deviation
explodes to 75.96, which implies the presence of observations with extreme values. The
other variables exhibit the same patterns. Considering that the outliers would potentially
lead to noise and flaws for the data, the empirical analysis is based on the trimmed sample.17
Note that standard deviations in column (2), (4) and (6) drop remarkably to a reasonable
14Upon the author’s calculation.
15Profitability refers to the ratio of profit to revenue and export intensity is defined as the ratio of export
values to industrial sales in the data.
16Note that figures in the parentheses represent performance of firms with positive export values. The
pattern maintains.
17Throughout the paper, the data set is truncated at both tails at 1 percentile level. Considering wide
coverage of the entire manufacturing sector, truncating the data set to 1 percentile level won’t induce the
data to lose its main characteristics. Furthermore, I carried out the same regressions for samples trimmed
at distinct levels as the benchmark case (1 percentile), i.e. 0.5% as well as every consecutive 1 percentile
level from 2 up to 5. The main conclusion holds.
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range. Another noteworthy feature of the data is the negative investment-to-capital ratio,
which results from the fact that around 25% of firm-year observations in the data carry
out negative investment. The negative investment is interpreted as fixed asset resale and
transfer and can also be reflective of lumpy investment. On the whole, private firms have
higher investment intensity (I/K) (0.092) than SOEs (-0.032), which is also true for sales-
to-capital (Y/K) ratio. Turning to financing sources, private firms hold a cash flow ratio
four times as high as that of SOEs.18 In contrast, SOEs (0.71) have higher debt-to-asset
ratios (DAR) than private firms (0.57). The financial situation provides some evidence
that private firms rely more on internal resources to finance their investment activities,
whereas SOEs are more likely to turn to external sources.
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.4.1 Financing Constraints by Firm Ownership and Size
Table 27 reports the results from estimating Equation 3.16 for the pooled sample and
sub-samples of private firms and SOEs respectively. Arellano and Bond AR(1) tests show
that there are first-order autocorrelation for the error terms among all three samples, which
verifies the invalidity of using second lags to instrument the endogenous variables. The tests
of AR(2) do not demonstrate second-order autocorrelation, therefore endogenous variables
dated at t-3 are used as instruments for the first difference equation estimation; in addition,
first differences of endogenous variables dated at t-2 are used for the level equation.
The focus of this chapter is the coefficients on the explicit proxies of financing constraint
indicator Λit, i.e. coefficients on the ratio of lagged debt to assets (DAR) and the lagged
interest coverage ratio (COV). With regard to the pooled-sample, both coefficients are
18The CF variables is constructed by summing operating profit and current depreciation, as previous
literature does.
63
positive and significant at 1% level, which holds for the private firms too. The magnitudes
of both coefficients are higher for private firms though, equal to 0.0304 (COV) and 0.0830
(DAR) respectively. For SOEs, however, the coefficient on COV becomes insignificant
and the one on DAR (0.0343) is of much smaller magnitude. This evidence suggests that
Chinese manufacturing firms on the whole are financially constrained, and that private
firms are more constrained than SOEs. This result is highly consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Poncet et al. (2010)) that the presence of “political pecking order” of firms
provides more favorable environment for SOEs in the allocation of credits whereas private
firms are facing more barriers. While Poncet et al. (2010) argue that SOEs are not financing
constrained at all, my results illustrate that even SOEs are slightly constrained in the
Chinese manufacturing sector. This difference arises partly in that a broader coverage of
firms in my analysis contains more exhaustive information that delivers a more general
picture.
To make a further investigation within each ownership sub-sample, firm size is utilized
as a classification. Table 28 presents results for large- and medium/small-sized firms sepa-
rately. Comparison among different samples in Table 28 suggests that the most financing
constrained firms in the manufacturing sector are the medium/small private firms, with
positive and significant coefficients on both COV and DAR in column (4), the magnitudes
of which are 0.0199 and 0.0900 respectively.
It is worth noting there is no evidence of financing constraints facing large private firms.
After a transition of over 30 years, the private sector is playing an increasingly important
role in boosting Chinese economic growth. As described in section 3.3.2.2, large private
firms outperform all other types of firms. Furthermore, some industries are even largely led
by private firms, for example, the solar photovoltaic equipment industry. In fact, several
large private solar PV firms like Yingli in Baoding (Hebei province) have become pillar
enterprises in the local economy. Local governments, thereby have launched facilitating
policies to channel more resources into these firms in order to maintain employment and
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to foster local economic growth. Easy access to credits are one facet of such policies. At
the national level, in the late 1990s Chinese constitution acknowledged that private sector
is an indispensable and integral part of the economy (He´ricourt and Poncet (2009)). With
both law and policy support, it is not surprising that frictions in the financial market are
gradually eliminated for the private firms, mostly the large ones.
Another striking finding is that medium/small state-owned firms are facing financing
constraints to some extent, which is reflected by the positive and significant coefficient on
DAR (equal to 0.0941). While the coefficient on DAR of SOEs is roughly the same level as
their private counterparts, the coefficient on COV is negative and insignificant, suggesting
that medium/small SOEs are less financing constrained than private firms of similar size.
Taken into consideration of the relatively poor profitability of medium/small SOEs, as
Table 25 illustrates, this result suggests that firm efficiency has gain more importance in
the Chinese economy even though the “political pecking order” of firms still exists to a
certain degree. Now that large SOEs are politically assigned with the highest priority,
they are facing no credit friction at all. Even though medium/small private firms absorb
a growing share of the labor force and provide relatively good performance, obtaining
external credits is still costly which therefore hinders their development. This conclusion
largely corresponds with what is found by Chan et al. (2012), that is, large firms are
generally not credit constrained whereas the smaller ones do encounter financial friction.
Love (2003) and Schiantarelli (1996) argue that small firms are more likely to subject to
asymmetric information problems and transaction costs. Large firms, on the contrary,
may enjoy preferential credit access through political connection or directed-credit policies
(Chan et al. (2012)).
3.4.2 Financing Constraints by Economic Region
There is remarkable variation in economic development across different regions. As a
whole, there are thirty-one provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, excluding
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Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Following the NBS criterion, I divide China into four
economic regions: east and coastal, northeast, middle and west.19 The east and coastal
region includes 10 provinces and municipalities located in the east and coastal areas, like
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, etc. This region is the most developed area in China,
with the highest population density and highest per capita GDP as well as investment.
Moreover, this region attracts the largest volumes of FDI and human resources. In contrast,
the western region is the least developed due to its disadvantage in geography, lack of
technology and human resources as well as relatively poor infrastructure. The northeast
and the middle regions fall in between. Overall, the level of development decreases from
the east and coastal to the west. The relationship between financial and real sides of the
economy has long attracted attention.
Table 29 shows the financing constraints across economic regions and reports financing
constraints facing SOEs and private firms within each region. First of all, as illustrated
by column (1), (4), (7) and (10), firms in the east and coastal region are on average
more constrained than the remaining three regions. Coefficients on both financial factors
COV and DAR are positive and significant at 1 percent level, and they are the largest
among the four regions. When we break down firms by ownership, three more interesting
findings emerge. First, private firms display higher financing constraints than SOEs in each
region. Second, as to SOEs, comparison among the four regions indicates that no financing
constraints are detected in the west, whereas SOEs in the east and coastal region are less
constrained than SOEs in the northeast and the middle regions. In addition, private firms
in the east and coastal region are more financing constrained than the middle and the west
regions. The by-ownership evidence suggests that the highest financing constraints in the
east and coastal region result mostly from the constrained private firms in the region.
It is widely accepted that countries and areas with higher levels of economic develop-
ment also enjoy healthier financial systems, thus are subject less to capital market imper-
19The detailed classification method is presented in the appendix Table A9.
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fection and credit misallocation. Our results suggest the opposite. That private firms - the
most competitive group - in China’s most developed economic region face more financing
constraints can add evidence to the growing literature of resource misallocation in China.20
Care must be taken in interpreting the results, however. Local informal financial institu-
tions have been well developed in the east and coastal region and are playing a critical
role in financing private firms in the region.21 However, it is highly possible that official
data released by the NBS fails to incorporate informal sources of credits. Consequently,
our results may only hold for formal credits.
3.4.3 Financing Constraints by High-Tech/Non-High-Tech Industries
In the recent years, high-tech industries have witnessed pronounced growth in the whole
manufacturing sector in China.22 Between 2000 and 2005, high-tech industries enjoyed
an annual growth rate of 27.5% in value added. In 2005, the annual sales in high-tech
industries amounted to 3,400 billion RMB, and the value added accounted for 4.4% in
GDP. Additionally, high-tech products took up 28.6% of overall exports in 2005, with an
absolute volume of 218.3 billion dollars, which was six times that of the late 1990s (11th
Five-year Plan for High-tech Industry, p.5).23 High-tech industries have played a critical
role in prompting technology development, which serves as a driving force for economic
growth. To encourage the development of high-tech industries, policies were laid out to
strengthen financial support for related industries. Therefore, other things equal, access to
credit should be easier and less costly for high-tech industries in the manufacturing sector.
Table 30 reports results for high-tech and non high-tech manufacturing firms separately.
Column (1) shows the pool-sample regression result, which indicates that as a whole the
manufacturing sector is financing constrained. This finding is highly consistent with what
20For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
21Like areas in Wenzhou (Zhejiang province), Quanzhou(Fujian province). See Tsai (2004).
22See the Appendix Table A8 for the detailed high-tech industry classification.
23www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2007tongzhi/W020070514615556997089.pdf
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Table 27 column (1) reflects and the magnitudes of estimates are quite similar between the
two. Thus in the pooled sample, whether to include high-tech industry dummy or 2-digit
industry dummies only leads to minor quantitative changes for the results. As shown by the
rest of Table 30, while high-tech industries face no financing constraints, other industries
suffer greatly from capital market imperfection. In particular, not only private firms have
difficulty in accessing credits, state-owned firms are not able to access credits freely as well.
When I further divide firms by size, the pattern persists. Regardless of size distinction,
all the coefficients on financial variables are statistically insignificant for high-tech indus-
tries(Table 31), implying that they are free of financing constraints. Outside the high-tech
industries, only large firms are free of financing constraints while medium/small firms -
state-owned and private - are constrained from obtaining external credits. However, for
medium/small SOEs, the coefficient on DAR is positive and significant but the magnitude
(0.0560) is roughly 80 percent of that for the private firms (0.0714). In addition, the coef-
ficient on COV of medium/small SOEs is negative and insignificant whereas the coefficient
of private medium/small firms is positive (0.0154) and statistically significant at 1 percent
level. Hence, in the industries outside the high-tech, medium/small private firms are more
constrained than their state-owned counterparts.
3.5 DISCUSSION
3.5.1 Nonlinearity
Linearization of the Euler equation plays a crucial role of the whole analysis. On the one
hand, the linearized reduced form specification highly simplifies the estimation. However,
the associated cost of doing so is losing nonlinear features the data may exhibit. There are
two streams of existing literature that conduct investment Euler equation estimation: one
originating from Whited (1992) estimates the nonlinear Euler equation directly through
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GMM, the other following Love (2003) estimates the linearized version via dynamic linear
panel data GMM estimator. Now that the whole paper has been built on the linearization
method, it is worthwhile to conduct the nonlinear estimation to check how much robustness
the results could demonstrate.
3.5.2 Entry and Exit
Brandt et al. (2012) find that the manufacturing sector during years 1998 to 2007 expe-
rienced substantial entry and exit of firms.24 So far, most of the existing literature that
studies investment and financing constraints has neglected this particular aspect, which
may be partially due to data structures or model simplification. Nonetheless, financing
constraint is closely related to how well a firm can grow and stay active. Intuitively, ignor-
ing the elements of entry and exit would lead to downward biased estimates of financing
constraints presuming that there is net exit. As such, it is of significant importance to in-
troduce entry and exit dimension into the traditional investment model. Schu¨ndeln (2005)
models firm dynamics by incorporating entry and exit to identify the cost of financing
constraint in Ghanaian Manufacturing. This work certainly sheds light on the extension I
plan to make.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I use the Chinese Industrial Survey Data spanning from 1998 to 2007 to
examine the level of financing constraints. Unlike earlier studies, the dataset I utilize
contains all the above-scale manufacturing firms and thus has a broader platform than
either listed firms or survey data confined to certain geographic regions. Building on the
24Brandt et al. (2012) matched firms that changed IDs spanning 1998-2007 to avoid counting the incum-
bent firms as either exit or entry.
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Euler equation approach and through dynamic GMM estimation, I find that SOEs, overall,
are slightly financing constrained whereas private firms face much greater obstacles in
accessing credits. Moreover, the analysis of financing constraints level by firm size within
each ownership category suggests that large firms are not credit constrained regardless of
ownership. Among medium/small firms, SOEs are less financially constrained than their
private counterparts. Further, there is cross-region variation in accessing external finance.
The east and coastal region is the most financially constrained region among the four (east
and coastal, northeast, middle and west), which is largely due to the constrained private
firms in the region. Last, high-tech firms exhibit no financing constraints at all whereas in
other industries, medium and small firms suffer from credit distortion with private firms
being constrained to a greater degree.
Several extensions can be made in the future. First, in contrast with linear estimation,
it is worthwhile to conduct nonlinear estimation as so to check how much robustness the
results could demonstrate. Second, extending the model by incorporating entry and exit
could generate a more precise estimate of financing constraint level.
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4.0 FUTURE WORK
The core of this dissertation is to exploit the new micro data to provide a new perspective
on productivity differences of vertically-integrated manufacturing firms in China. In partic-
ular, it is the first work to decompose firm productivity into stage- and plant (equipment)-
level and explain productivity differences through the lens of firms’ internal organization.
We see this dissertation as the start of a research agenda that may encompass several
further projects. In chapter 2, we impose the assumption that in a vertically-integrated
operation, each production unit (i.e., equipment) operates independently both within and
across stages. In an immediate extension, we are working to relax this assumption by
allowing for productivity shocks to be correlated within and across stages. This full-fledged
description of productivity goes one step further to characterize the links of vertically-
integrated firms’ internal activities. We will jointly estimate production functions for the
three stages in the value chain. This extension will make an important contribution in
methodology to the production function literature.
The second project focuses on China’s industrial policy in the steel industry. Beijing has
been struggling to restructure the industry around a few giant national champions through
two major policy tools: capacity reduction and M&A (merger and acquisition). We are
working to examine the consequences of these two aspects of policy. In one paper, we focus
on firms’ decision-making on investment under the policy influence of capacity reduction.
On one hand, firms have strong incentives to expand ex-ante to remain a significant player
so as to avoid being shuttered or downsized. On the other hand, as suggested by the
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current paper, the government would likely cut private firms, which are nevertheless the
most efficient segments of the industry. Therefore, the policy on capacity reduction may
lead to unintended consequences.
To understand the dynamic implication of this policy, we will construct a dynamic
structural model of firm investment in steel capacity where SOEs and private firms expand
under different borrowing/hiring/input constraints. We will estimate the model using
annual firm-level information originating from the Chinese Iron and Steel Association that
we assembled on output, steel capacity (capital), employees, wages, intermediate inputs
and profits over 2000-2013. With the estimated model, we plan to run counterfactual
experiments of various capacity reduction schemes and study their impacts on efficiency
and welfare.
In addition, we will explore the impact of M&A on firm efficiency and market power.
The central government has constantly promoted (and often imposed) consolidation during
the last 15 years. We have constructed a timeline with details of annual M&A transactions
from 2000 to 2013 in the steel industry. A particularly nice feature of our data is that firms
report information separately for subsidiary units both before and after such reorganiza-
tions. Therefore, the inputs and detailed disaggregated output data by final product enable
us to examine firms’ performance with regard to productivity, product mix and markups
before and after M&A.
We anticipate a series of papers that will generate policy implications to a globally
important industry at the center of China’s proposals for rebalancing of the economy.
In addition, the implication of our work is not restricted to China’s steel industry. The
analytic frameworks that we propose should provide broad insights into future research on
the performance of complex industrial operations, and in particular, the industries under
government regulation.
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Figure 1: Output of Major Steel Products Between 1996 and 2015
Figure 2: Import of Iron Ore
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Figure 3: High Value-Added Steel Products
Figure 4: Continuous Casting Ratio
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Figure 5: Crude Steel by Production Technique
Figure 6: Import and Export of Rolled Steel
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Figure 7: Import and Export of High Value-Added Rolled Steel
Figure 8: Fixed Investment in the Steel Industry
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Figure 9: Production Capacity of Steel
Figure 10: Growth Rate of Steel Capacity
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Figure 11: Utilization Rate of Steel Capacity
Figure 12: Excess Capacity of Crude Steel
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Figure 13: Shares of Key Firms in Total Capacity and Total Excess Capacity
Figure 14: Capacity Growth Rate of Small Firms and Shares of Small Firms in Total
Excess Capacity
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Figure 15: Concentration Ratio
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Figure 16: Steel Technology of Integrated Facilities
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Figure 17: Structure of Integrated Facilities
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Figure 18: Facility-level TFP and Size of Integrated Facilities
Notes: VI represents integrated facilities. Facility size is measured by the total size of
basic oxygen furnaces (steel making) within the facility; each plot represents a facility-
month observation.
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Figure 19: Grade of Iron Ore and Size of Iron-Making Plants (Blast Furnace)
Notes: Blast furnace size is measured by the effective volume of the furnace in cubic meters
(m3).
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Figure 20: Firm Number Evolution in the Chinese Manufacturing Sector
Figure 21: Output Capital Ratio of Chinese Manufacturing Sector
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Table 1: China Steel Overview
Value of Share of steel Output per
Number of industrial output in the total Employment man-year
Year firms (1 billion RMB) value of Industrial Output (%) (1 million) (tons)
1998 3,260 388.32 5.7 28.5 40.2
1999 3,042 409.74 5.6 27.7 44.8
2000 2,997 473.29 5.5 26.2 49.1
2001 3,176 570.73 6.0 24.9 60.8
2002 3,333 649.24 5.9 23.9 76.2
2003 4,119 1,000.74 7.0 25.6 86.9
2004 4,992 1,566.45 8.4 26.1 104.4
2005 6,686 2,124.78 8.4 28.7 123.8
2006 6,999 2,540.38 8.0 29.6 142.2
2007 7,161 3,370.30 8.3 30.4 160.9
2008 8,012 4,472.80 8.8 31.4 163.4
2009 7,773 4,263.62 7.8 32.3 178.6
2010 7,881 5,183.36 7.4 34.6 184.8
2011 6,742 6,406.70 7.6 34.0 206.5
Sources:
a Number of firms in 1998 is from Industrial Survey Data; 1999-2008 are from China Steel Yearbook,
various issues; 2009-2011 are from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
b Value of industrial output is in current values; 1998 is from Industrial Survey Data; the rest are from
China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
c Employment in 1998 is from Industrial Survey Data; 1999-2003 are from China Data Online; 2004-2011
are from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
d Shares of steel in the total value of the industrial output are based upon the author’s calculation.
e Output per man-year = Crude steel/employment, based upon the author’s calculation.
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Table 2: Total Number of Firms, Integrated Facilities, Equipment
and Production Share by Ownership
Panel A: Sintering (Machine)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Central Provincial Private
Number of Machines 343 56 203 84
Product Share 100% 19.8% 61.3% 18.9%
Panel B: Iron Making (Blast Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Central Provincial Private
Number of Furnaces 490 92 249 149
Product Share 100% 19.3% 59.4% 21.3%
Panel C: Steel Making (Basic Oxygen Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Central Provincial Private
Number of Furnaces 342 68 209 65
Product Share 100% 18.4% 63.4% 18.3%
Panel D: Integrated Facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Central Provincial Private
Number of Facilities 136 26 77 33
Panel E: Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Central Provincial Private
Number of Firms 59 9 35 15
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Equipment Size by
Ownership
Panel A: Sintering (Machine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Total 343 156 127 24 853
Central 56 204 161 24 853
Provincial 203 158 127 24 550
Private 84 122 84 24 360
Panel B: Pig Iron Making (Blast Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Total 490 1016 926 128 5500
Central 92 1230 1046 200 4038
Provincial 249 1127 1036 128 5500
Private 149 698 460 179 2680
Panel C: Steel Making (Basic Oxygen Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Total 342 95 62 12 300
Central 68 123 66 30 260
Provincial 209 93 63 12 300
Private 65 72 39 30 180
Notes: The size of a sintering machine is measured by its
effective areas in m2; the size of a blast furnace is measured
by its effective volumes in m3; the size of a basic oxygen
furnace is measured by its tonnage.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Integrated Facility Size
by Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number Mean Size Std. Dev Min Max
Total 136 218 185 30 990
Central 26 301 212 30 840
Provincial 77 227 190 30 990
Private 33 131 96 40 540
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxy-
gen furnaces (steel making) within the facility.
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Table 5: Number and Production Share of Integrated Facilities by Size
Panel A: Size Distribution of Integrated Facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile Total
size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Number Number Number Number Number
Central 3 6 5 12 26
Provincial 16 21 18 22 77
Private 13 11 8 1 33
Total 32 38 31 35 136
Panel B: Output Share by Integrated Facilities Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile Total
size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Output Share Output Share Output Share Output Share Output Share
Central 0.8% 1.5% 2.9% 13.3% 18.5%
Provincial 6.0% 11.6% 14.3% 31.7% 63.5%
Private 4.3% 4.6% 6.7% 2.4% 18.0%
Total 11.1% 17.7% 23.9% 47.4% 100.0%
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen furnaces (steel making) within
the facility; the size quartiles are calculated over the observations in the whole sample; output
is measured by steel.
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Table 6: Internal Configuration of Integrated Facilities
Sintering (Machine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Ownership Variables Total size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Central Number of Machines 2.06 2.34 2.38 2.50 1.66
Average Size 267 102 95 222 393
Provincial Number of Machines 2.38 1.71 2.22 2.41 2.87
Average Size 189 116 141 225 248
Private Number of Machines 2.12 1.71 2.31 2.09 5.00
Average Size 129 74 147 151 360
Iron Making (Blast Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Ownership Variables Total size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Central Number of Furnaces 2.27 2.71 2.28 2.13 2.25
Average Size 2031 475 985 1902 2840
Provincial Number of Furnaces 2.67 1.99 2.84 2.59 2.94
Average Size 1406 613 809 1770 2125
Private Number of Furnaces 2.82 1.85 3.29 3.56 3.00
Average Size 707 482 614 826 2680
Steel Making (Basic Oxygen Furnace)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Ownership Variables Total size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Central Number of Furnaces 2.42 1.30 1.83 2.26 2.97
Average Size 131 45 87 94 183
Provincial Number of Furnaces 2.57 1.49 2.21 3.09 3.13
Average Size 94 47 67 81 151
Private Number of Furnaces 1.90 1.09 2.00 2.69 3.00
Average Size 75 54 79 84 180
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen furnaces (steel making) within the
facility; the size of a sintering machine is measured by its effective areas in m2; the size of a blast furnace
is measured by its effective volumes in m3; the size of a basic oxygen furnace is measured by its tonnage.
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Table 7: Production Functions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sintering Iron Making Steel Making
Variables OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
l 0.212*** 0.215*** 0.119*** 0.101*** 0.0602*** 0.0583***
(0.0077) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0044) (0.0021)
k 0.812*** 0.901*** 0.298*** 0.378*** 0.155*** 0.137***
(0.0065) (0.00027) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0029)
m 0.594*** 0.555*** 0.746*** 0.862***
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0019 )
age 0.000885*** 0.0006501 0.000267* -0.000436* -0.000305*** -0.000522***
(0.00028) (0.00090) (0.00014) (0.00024) (0.00010) (0.00017)
Observations 7,630 7,630 10,087 10,087 8,514 8,514
R-squared 0.808 0.921 0.927
Ownership FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors of GMM are computed via bootstrap of 1000 replications.
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Table 8: Dispersion of TFP
(1) (2)
Variables Std Dev 90:10 ratio
Sintering 0.58 2.31
Iron Making 0.21 1.30
Steel Making 0.11 1.25
Integrated Facilities 0.79 1.91
Notes: 90:10 ratios for sintering, iron making
and steel making are based on the average pro-
ductivity of machines/furnaces over time. The
ratio for integrated facilities is based on the av-
erage productivity of integrated facilities over
time.
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Table 9: Ownership Premium in Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
Sintering Iron Making Steel Making
Variables logtfp logtfp logtfp
Private -0.0855*** 0.0515*** 0.0576***
(0.0153) (0.00606) (0.00379)
Provincial -0.102*** 0.0110** 0.00819***
(0.0133) (0.00558) (0.00315)
Constant 0.0395 -0.0640*** -0.0384***
(0.0293) (0.0122) (0.00721)
Observations 8,728 11,837 8,510
R-squared 0.015 0.020 0.047
Time FE YES YES YES
Notes: Machines/furnaces of central state-owned facilities
are the omitted group. Private and provincial indicate own-
ership dummies.
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Table 10: Equipment TFP and Equipment Size by Produc-
tion Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Sintering Iron Making Steel Making
Variables logtfp logtfp logtfp
logsize -0.160*** -0.0443*** -0.0251***
(0.0127) (0.00541) (0.00440)
Private x logsize -0.0104 -0.0460*** -0.0637***
(0.0184) (0.00901) (0.00656)
Provincial x logsize 0.0609*** 0.0146** -0.0277***
(0.0145) (0.00623) (0.00481)
Private -0.0981 0.319*** 0.307***
(0.0887) (0.0595) (0.0292)
Provincial -0.426*** -0.0964** 0.117***
(0.0721) (0.0431) (0.0227)
Constant 0.814*** 0.238*** 0.0772***
(0.0687) (0.0391) (0.0219)
Observations 8,728 11,837 8,510
R-squared 0.070 0.045 0.157
Time FE YES YES YES
Notes: The size of a sintering machine is measured by its effective
areas in m2; the size of a blast furnace is measured by its effective
volumes in m3; the size of a basic oxygen furnace is measured by
its tonnage. Machines/furnaces of central state-owned facilities
are the omitted group. Private and provincial indicate ownership
dummies.
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Table 11: Difference in the Share
of Rich Ore (%) in 2012
(1)
Variables Share of rich ore
Private -14.29*
(8.429)
Provincial SOE -2.231
(7.997)
Constant 56.10***
(6.972)
Observations 76
R-squared 0.061
Notes: Central SOEs are the omitted
group. Private and provincial indicate
ownership dummies.
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Table 12: Weights for TFP Aggregation
(1) (2) (3)
Weight 1 Weight 2
Elasticity Value Share
Sintering γˆ2 ∗ γˆ3 Mean Std Dev
0.48 0.52 0.16
Iron making γˆ3 Mean Std Dev
0.86 0.82 0.05
Steel making 1 1
Notes: γˆ2 is the estimated elasticity of material
input (iron ore) in iron-making production func-
tion. γˆ3 is the estimated elasticity of material in-
put (iron) in steel-making production function.
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Table 13: Ownership Premium of Integrated
Facility TFP
(1) (2)
Facility Facility
Variables logtfp logtfp
logsize 0.00715
(0.0164)
Private x logsize -0.136***
(0.0237)
Provincial x logsize -0.0809***
(0.0187)
Private 0.0622*** 0.707***
(0.0178) (0.122)
Provincial 0.0393** 0.460***
(0.0156) (0.103)
Constant -0.0911*** -0.140
(0.0341) (0.0960)
Observations 3,440 3,440
R-squared 0.018 0.053
Time FE YES YES
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size
of basic oxygen furnaces (steel making) within
the facility. Private and provincial are ownership
dummies.
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Table 14: Ownership Premium of Integrated Facility TFP by Facil-
ity Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Variables logtfp logtfp logtfp logtfp
Private 0.327*** 0.135*** -0.198*** 0.195***
(0.0528) (0.0464) (0.0277) (0.0451)
Provincial 0.248*** 0.119*** -0.0515** -0.0223
(0.0527) (0.0421) (0.0257) (0.0175)
Constant -0.222*** -0.141* -0.0408 -0.101**
(0.0822) (0.0811) (0.0616) (0.0472)
Observations 748 918 802 972
R-squared 0.082 0.037 0.107 0.056
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen furnaces
(steel making) within the facility. The size quartiles are calculated over the
facility-month observations in the pooled sample. Private and provincial
are ownership dummies.
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Table 15: Number of Equipment and Facility Size by Pro-
duction Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson Poisson Poisson
Sintering Iron Making Steel Making
Variables Number Number Number
logsize -0.246*** -0.0652* 0.370***
(0.0342) (0.0337) (0.0362)
Private x logsize 0.603*** 0.436*** 0.133**
(0.0495) (0.0458) (0.0522)
Provincial x logsize 0.508*** 0.192*** -0.0426
(0.0388) (0.0378) (0.0403)
Observations 3,440 3,440 3,440
R-squared
Owner FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Notes: Number is simplified for number of machines/furnaces.
Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen furnaces
(steel making) within the facility. Private and provincial are own-
ership dummies.
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Table 16: Average Equipment Size and Facility Size by Pro-
duction Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Sintering Iron Making Steel Making
Variables logsize logsize logsize
logsize 0.715*** 0.750*** 0.617***
(0.0323) (0.0281) (0.0204)
Private x logsize -0.133*** -0.274*** -0.170***
(0.0466) (0.0406) (0.0294)
Provincial x logsize -0.323*** -0.0850*** -0.00481
(0.0368) (0.0321) (0.0232)
Observations 3,440 3,440 3,440
R-squared 0.337 0.538 0.594
Owner FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Notes: Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen
furnaces (steel making) within the facility. The size of a sintering
machine is measured by its effective areas in m2; the size of a
blast furnace is measured by its effective volumes in m3; the size
of a basic oxygen furnace is measured by its tonnage. Private and
provincial are ownership dummies.
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Table 17: TFP Correlation by Ownership and by Facility Size
Panel A: TFP correlation between sintering and iron making
(1) (3) (5) (7)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Central Mean 0.005 0.188 0.411 0.396
Std. Dev (0.0569) (0.437) (0.364) (0.313)
Provincial Mean 0.337 0.327 0.422 0.487
Std. Dev (0.311) (0.398) (0.306) (0.339)
Private Mean 0.573 0.535 0.257 0.240
Std. Dev (0.163) (0.294) (0.400)
Panel B: TFP correlation between iron making and steel making
(1) (3) (5) (7)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
size<90 [90,160) [160,300) size≥300
Central Mean 0.058 0.123 0.354 0.308
Std. Dev (0.0723) (0.447) (0.301) (0.341)
Provincial Mean 0.225 0.275 0.164 0.358
Std. Dev (0.437 (0.383) (0.491) (0.314)
Private Mean 0.475 0.357 0.178 0.123
Std. Dev (0.229) (0.373) (0.480)
Notes: The correlation is calculated over the monthly TFP by integrated facilities.
Facility size is measured by the total size of basic oxygen furnaces (steel making)
within the facility. The size quartiles are calculated over the facility-month obser-
vations in the pooled sample.
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Table 18: Total Cost Per Unit of Capacity
Panel A: Iron Making (Blast Furnace)
Size (m3) Unit cost( unit:1,000RMB))
450-1000 360
1000-2500 390
2500-4000 415
>4000 475
Panel B: (Steel Making) Basic Oxygen Furnace
Size (tonnage) Unit cost(unit:1,000RMB))
≤50t 2650
60-80 3350
100-120 4150
150-180 4650
200-250 5150
≤300 5750
Notes: Data Source: Chinese Iron and Steel Asso-
ciation. 1 US Dollar = 6.78 RMB.
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Table 19: Production Function: Robustness
Check
(1) (2)
Steel Making
Price-Adjusted Non-Adjusted
Variables GMM GMM
l 0.0598*** 0.0583***
(0.0022) (0.0021)
k 0.117*** 0.137***
(0.0027) (0.0029)
m 0.870*** 0.862***
(0.0015) (0.0019 )
age -0.000629*** -0.000522***
(0.00020) (0.00017)
Observations 8,514 8,514
Ownership FE YES YES
Province FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Note: Standard errors of GMM estimation are com-
puted via bootstrap of 1000 replications.
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Table 20: Ownership Premium of Productiv-
ity in Steel Making: Robustness Check
(1) (2)
Price-Adjusted Non-Adjusted
Variables logtfp logtfp
Private 0.0746*** 0.0576***
(0.00402) (0.00379)
Provincial 0.0179*** 0.00819***
(0.00334) (0.00315)
Constant -0.0459*** -0.0384***
(0.00765) (0.00721)
Observations 8,510 8,510
R-squared 0.056 0.047
Time FE YES YES
Notes: Furnaces of central state-owned facilities
are the omitted group. Provincial and private are
ownership dummies.
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Table 21: Output Quality Differences by Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sintering Sintering Iron Making Iron Making Steel Making Steel Making
Variables Qualification Grade Stability Qualification Premium Grade Qualification Secondary
Private -5.259*** -10.35*** -0.131** -2.674*** -0.101* -38.13***
(0.392) (0.814) (0.0586) (0.769) (0.0569) (1.432)
Provincial -3.233*** -2.195*** 0.0819 -10.72*** -0.118** -24.45***
(0.340) (0.707) (0.0539) (0.708) (0.0473) (1.190)
Constant 95.52*** 90.60*** 99.86*** 70.06*** 99.87*** 55.36***
(0.750) (1.559) (0.118) (1.544) (0.108) (2.729)
Observations 8,728 8,728 11,837 11,837 8,510 8,510
R-squared 0.024 0.026 0.006 0.031 0.007 0.081
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: All quality measures are in percentage points. Secondary denotes the share of steel that goes through
secondary steel refining and provides an important piece of evidence on the quality of steel.
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Table 22: Quality-Adjusted Owner-
ship Premium of Facility-level Produc-
tivity
(1) (2)
Variables logtfp logtfp
Private 0.0622*** 0.0571***
(0.0178) (0.0185)
Provincial 0.0393** 0.0490***
(0.0156) (0.0158)
Constant -0.0911*** 0.120
(0.0341) (0.416)
Observations 3,440 3,440
R-squared 0.018 0.050
sinter quality NO YES
iron quality NO YES
steel quality NO YES
Time FE YES YES
Notes: Central state-owned facilities are
the omitted group. Provincial and private
are ownership dummies.
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Table 23: Size Classification Criteria
Annual sales Employment
Large ≥400 million ≥1,000
Medium [20 million, 400 million) [300, 1000)
Small ≤20 million ≤300
Currency unit: RMB
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Table 24: Size and Ownership Distribution of Chinese Manufacturing Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State-owned Collective Private HMT Foreign Others
1998
Large 553(48.72) 137(12.07) 5(0.44) 114(10.08) 145(12.78) 181(15.95)
Medium 4,262(55.32) 1,261(16.37) 90(1.17) 565(7.33) 436(5.66) 1,090(14.15)
Small 42,297(30.03) 52,986(37.62) 10,281(7.30) 14,828(10.53) 10,005(7.10) 10,454(7.42)
2007
Large 607(11.52) 129(2.45) 714(13.55) 797(15.13) 1,312(24.90) 1,710(32.45)
Medium 600(5.61) 475(4.44) 2,327(21.77) 2,046(19.14) 2,644(24.74) 2,597(24.30)
Small 5,755(1.94) 15,475(5.21) 164,675(55.43) 28,654(9.64) 31,037(10.45) 51,494(17.33)
Besides firm number of each category, corresponding percentage points are reported in the parentheses(%).
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Table 25: Profitability and Export Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Firms
1998 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small
Profitability
Full Sample .029 -.062 -.021 .062 .046 .025
SOE .012 -.113 -.102 .054 .003 -.032
Private .082 .016 .027 .070 .057 .040
Export
Full Sample .178( .257) .182(.369) .150(.648) .261(.321) .283(.428) .196(.519)
SOE .085(.130) .100(.229) .036(.379) .112(.136) .079(.124) .039(.190)
Private .012(.030) .207(.495) .129(.718) .228(.211) .180(.306) .128(.418)
Export intensities of firms with positive export values are reported in the parentheses.
profitability = profit/sales
export performance = export/sales
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Table 26: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SOEs&Private SOEs Private
Variables Full sample Trimmed sample Full sample Trimmed sample Full sample Trimmed sample
I/K
Mean -0.56 0.062 -0.61 -0.032 -0.55 0.092
Median 0.04 0.045 0 0.0002 0.084 0.083
SD 75.96 0.57 111.83 0.50 60.52 0.59
Y/K
Mean 25.53 9.53 15.11 3.22 28.68 11.36
Median 4.22 4.23 0.97 1.04 5.72 5.63
SD 1724.91 16.29 2595.26 9.36 1355.85 17.36
CF/K
Mean 1.62 0.51 1.16 0.11 1.76 0.63
Median 0.18 0.18 0.012 0.014 0.25 0.25
SD 125.23 1.19 191.25 0.75 96.87 1.27
DAR
Mean 0.63 0.60 0.79 0.71 0.58 0.57
Median 0.63 0.62 0.75 0.71 0.59 0.60
SD 4.96 0.28 0.65 0.31 5.66 0.26
COV
Mean 3.55e+09 0.12 1.54e+10 0.10 10,937.79 0.12
Median 0.02 0.04 0 0.002 0.03 0.04
SD 2.02e+13 0.32 4.21e+13 0.49 7.76e+06 0.25
Trimmed represent samples that are truncated at 1 percentile level at both tails. To keep consistency with
previous notations, Y denotes sales, CF cash flow, COV interest coverage ratio and DAR total debt to total asset
ratio. I exclude observations with negative capital stocks.
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Table 27: Test for Financing Constraints by Ownership
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
(I/K)it SOEs&Private SOEs Private
(I/K)i,t−1 0.00838 0.168 -0.0344
(0.0518) (0.108) (0.0532)
(I/K)2i,t−1 0.0493 0.0426 0.0354
(0.0346) (0.0520) (0.0361)
(CF/K)i,t−1 0.0219*** 0.0101** 0.0233***
(0.00189) (0.00445) (0.00209)
(Y/K)i,t−1 0.00962*** 0.0118*** 0.00936***
(0.000590) (0.00184) (0.000594)
COVi,t−1 0.0198*** 0.00572 0.0304***
(0.00315) (0.00435) (0.00499)
DARi,t−1 0.0731*** 0.0343*** 0.0830***
(0.00483) (0.00982) (0.00575)
Time dummies Y Y Y
2-digit industry dummies Y Y Y
Ownership dummies Y N N
Observations 368,652 80,851 287,801
Number of firm 144,464 28,268 117,510
F test(p-value) 0 0 0
AR(1) test(p-value) 0 0.000109 0
AR(2) test(p-value) 0.698 0.458 0.637
Hansen Test(p-value) 0.00147 0.00897 0.156
Dataset is trimmed at 1 percentile level at both tails for all the regressors
reported in the table. The estimation is by two-step system GMM; 2-
digit industry dummies and year dummies are included;ownership dum-
mies are introduced in the full sample regression in column (1). Levels
of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-3 are used as GMM type instruments for
the first-difference equation;first differences of I/K and (I/K)2 dated
at t-2 are used as GMM type instruments for the level equation;CF/K,
Y/K, COV , DAR dated at t-1 plus time and industry dummies are
used as standard instruments(for column (1), ownership dummies are
also included). WC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
for heteroscedasticity adjustment.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 28: Test for Financing Constraints by Ownership and Firm Size
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(I/K)it SOEs Private
Large Medium&Small Large Medium&Small
(I/K)i,t−1 -0.196 0.117 -0.332 -0.140**
(0.166) (0.130) (0.218) (0.0612)
(I/K)2i,t−1 0.247 -0.00431 0.400* -0.0534
(0.245) (0.0649) (0.227) (0.0486)
(CF/K)i,t−1 -0.113 0.00911 -0.0141 0.0318***
(0.214) (0.00642) (0.0515) (0.00274)
(Y/K)i,t−1 0.00494 0.0421*** 0.0162** 0.0259***
(0.0525) (0.00711) (0.00739) (0.00141)
COVi,t−1 0.0151 -0.00246 -0.0222 0.0199***
(0.0298) (0.00629) (0.199) (0.00663)
DARi,t−1 -0.0127 0.0941*** 0.0836 0.0900***
(0.104) (0.0245) (0.364) (0.0102)
Time dummies Y Y Y Y
2-digit industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,679 77,172 1,553 286,248
Number of firm 1,104 27,620 779 117,164
F test(p-value) 0 0 0 0
AR(1) test(p-value) 0.498 0.000695 0.0138 1.92e-10
AR(2) test(p-value) 0.519 0.433 0.994 0.793
Hansen Test(p-value) 0.300 0.00297 0.119 0.0624
Dataset is trimmed at 1 percentile level at both tails for all the regressors reported in the
table. The estimation is by two-step system GMM; 2-digit industry dummies and year
dummies are included; size dummies are introduced in the all-size regressions in column
(1) and (4). Levels of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-3 are used as GMM type instruments
for the first-difference equation;first differences of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-2 are used
as GMM type instruments for the level equation;CF/K, Y/K, COV , DAR dated at
t-1 plus time and industry dummies are used as standard instruments(for column (1)
and (4), size dummies are also included). WC-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses for heteroscedasticity adjustment.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
113
T
ab
le
29
:
T
es
t
fo
r
F
in
an
ci
n
g
C
on
st
ra
in
ts
b
y
R
eg
io
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
E
a
st
&
C
o
a
st
N
o
rt
h
e
a
st
M
id
d
le
W
e
st
(I
/
K
) i
t
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
(I
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
-0
.0
2
7
0
-0
.0
2
5
1
-0
.0
4
3
5
-0
.4
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
0
-0
.3
9
9
*
*
0
.1
6
4
0
.2
8
3
0
.1
3
0
0
.0
6
5
9
0
.0
1
4
8
-0
.0
7
0
9
(0
.0
5
4
1
)
(0
.1
3
2
)
(0
.0
5
4
5
)
(0
.1
5
6
)
(0
.2
8
6
)
(0
.1
7
6
)
(0
.1
3
9
)
(0
.1
8
7
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.2
0
8
)
(0
.2
1
0
)
(I
/
K
)2 i
,t
−
1
0
.0
4
1
7
0
.0
6
8
0
0
.0
3
7
8
-0
.1
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
7
6
9
-0
.0
4
4
0
0
.0
3
8
3
0
.0
6
8
0
0
.0
5
5
8
0
.0
1
3
0
-0
.0
4
8
6
0
.0
1
3
1
(0
.0
3
9
2
)
(0
.0
7
6
3
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
5
9
8
)
(0
.1
0
5
)
(0
.0
7
4
0
)
(0
.0
6
7
2
)
(0
.0
6
2
4
)
(0
.0
8
1
4
)
(0
.0
7
6
9
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.1
1
3
)
(C
F
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
0
.0
2
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
1
*
*
0
.0
0
3
4
6
0
.0
1
5
4
*
0
.0
3
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
4
0
.0
3
4
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
2
2
0
.0
2
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
8
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
8
)
(0
.0
1
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
5
)
(Y
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
0
.0
0
8
8
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
7
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
8
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
9
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
1
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
6
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
5
7
)
C
O
V
i
,t
−
1
0
.0
2
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
5
7
0
.0
3
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
9
1
0
.0
0
6
0
9
0
.0
0
5
3
8
0
.0
1
6
7
*
*
0
.0
1
0
6
0
.0
3
1
1
*
*
0
.0
1
9
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
8
0
.0
2
6
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
D
A
R
i
,t
−
1
0
.0
7
8
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
3
*
0
.0
8
6
2
*
*
*
0
.0
7
4
0
*
*
*
0
.0
4
3
4
*
0
.0
9
6
0
*
*
*
0
.0
6
8
1
*
*
*
0
.0
4
7
6
*
*
0
.0
7
4
3
*
*
*
0
.0
4
7
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
4
0
.0
5
7
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
8
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
7
)
(0
.0
2
5
5
)
(0
.0
2
4
8
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
6
)
(0
.0
1
3
1
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
2
)
T
im
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
-d
ig
it
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
O
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
4
6
,6
1
5
3
4
,3
3
7
2
1
2
,2
7
8
2
0
,8
1
6
7
,3
6
8
1
3
,4
4
8
5
8
,3
1
3
2
0
,0
4
6
3
8
,2
6
7
4
2
,9
0
8
1
9
,1
0
0
2
3
,8
0
8
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
fi
rm
9
6
,3
2
3
1
1
,7
2
1
8
5
,1
6
3
8
,8
5
4
2
,8
9
1
6
,1
0
4
2
3
,2
4
6
7
,2
2
6
1
6
,4
0
5
1
6
,0
4
4
6
,4
3
1
9
,8
3
9
F
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e
)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
A
R
(1
)
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e
)
0
0
.0
7
7
2
0
0
.0
0
4
3
8
0
.1
3
4
0
.0
1
6
0
3
.2
7
e
-0
6
0
.0
0
0
2
4
9
5
.4
2
e
-0
5
0
.0
0
0
3
4
6
0
.0
0
2
0
9
8
.3
0
e
-0
5
A
R
(2
)
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e
)
0
.6
5
3
0
.6
0
0
0
.5
9
9
0
.4
2
4
0
.3
2
7
0
.2
9
1
0
.4
5
0
0
.4
6
2
0
.8
2
3
0
.4
0
6
0
.3
9
3
0
.9
6
6
H
a
n
se
n
T
e
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e
)
0
.0
0
5
7
3
0
.1
5
7
0
.0
8
0
3
0
.5
4
1
0
.1
2
4
0
.1
9
8
0
.2
7
8
0
.4
9
6
0
.2
7
5
0
.7
6
9
0
.2
7
1
0
.7
9
0
D
a
ta
se
t
is
tr
im
m
e
d
a
t
1
p
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
le
v
e
l
a
t
b
o
th
ta
il
s
fo
r
a
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
th
e
ta
b
le
.
T
h
e
e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
is
b
y
tw
o
-s
te
p
sy
st
e
m
G
M
M
;
2
-d
ig
it
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
in
c
lu
d
e
d
;o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
in
tr
o
d
u
c
e
d
in
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
e
a
c
h
re
g
io
n
.
L
e
v
e
ls
o
f
I
/
K
a
n
d
(I
/
K
)2
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
3
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
G
M
M
ty
p
e
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
fo
r
th
e
fi
rs
t-
d
iff
e
re
n
c
e
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
;fi
rs
t
d
iff
e
re
n
c
e
s
o
f
I
/
K
a
n
d
(I
/
K
)2
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
2
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
G
M
M
ty
p
e
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
fo
r
th
e
le
v
e
l
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
;C
F
/
K
,
Y
/
K
,
C
O
V
,
D
A
R
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
1
p
lu
s
ti
m
e
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
st
a
n
d
a
rd
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
.
W
C
-r
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s
fo
r
h
e
te
ro
sc
e
d
a
st
ic
it
y
a
d
ju
st
m
e
n
t.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
114
T
ab
le
3
0
:
T
es
t
fo
r
F
in
an
ci
n
g
C
on
st
ra
in
ts
b
y
H
ig
h
-T
ec
h
an
d
N
on
H
ig
h
-T
ec
h
In
d
u
st
ry
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(I
/
K
) i
t
P
o
o
le
d
-s
a
m
p
le
H
ig
h
-t
ec
h
in
d
u
st
ri
es
N
o
n
h
ig
h
-t
ec
h
in
d
u
st
ri
es
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s&
P
ri
v
a
te
S
O
E
s
P
ri
v
a
te
(I
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
0
.0
0
8
6
1
-0
.0
0
8
2
5
-0
.0
7
3
2
-0
.1
2
0
0
.0
1
0
5
0
.1
6
6
-0
.0
3
0
6
(0
.0
5
1
7
)
(0
.1
6
5
)
(0
.0
9
7
4
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.0
5
3
8
)
(0
.1
2
1
)
(0
.0
5
5
5
)
(I
/
K
)2 i
,t
−
1
0
.0
5
0
0
-0
.0
2
1
8
0
.0
2
0
2
0
.0
1
2
4
0
.0
4
9
1
0
.0
3
7
7
0
.0
3
2
9
(0
.0
3
4
6
)
(0
.1
9
7
)
(0
.0
9
6
0
)
(0
.1
0
4
)
(0
.0
3
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
7
1
)
(0
.0
3
6
7
)
(C
F
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
0
.0
2
2
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
5
4
*
*
0
.0
2
4
8
*
0
.0
3
0
9
*
*
0
.0
2
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
7
1
*
*
0
.0
2
3
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
9
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
1
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
1
)
(Y
/
K
) i
,t
−
1
0
.0
0
9
4
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
5
1
*
0
.0
0
6
0
5
0
.0
0
6
4
8
*
*
0
.0
0
9
5
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
3
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
5
8
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
8
1
)
C
O
V
i,
t−
1
0
.0
1
9
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
7
0
.0
1
6
0
-0
.0
3
1
3
0
.0
1
9
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
3
0
0
.0
3
0
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
2
)
D
A
R
i,
t−
1
0
.0
7
4
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
2
-0
.0
5
2
7
0
.0
6
3
8
0
.0
7
6
9
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
8
*
*
*
0
.0
8
8
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
7
8
)
(0
.0
3
0
8
)
(0
.0
3
5
2
)
(0
.0
3
9
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
0
)
T
im
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
H
ig
h
-t
ec
h
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
6
8
,6
5
2
1
1
,9
1
8
5
,6
8
1
6
,2
3
7
3
5
6
,7
3
4
7
5
,1
7
0
2
8
1
,5
6
4
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
fi
rm
1
4
4
,4
6
4
4
,9
7
1
2
,2
2
6
2
,8
2
9
1
4
0
,4
8
6
2
6
,5
6
6
1
1
5
,1
4
2
F
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e)
0
0
0
.0
0
2
5
2
0
0
0
0
A
R
(1
)
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e)
0
0
.3
3
5
0
.1
2
9
0
.1
9
2
0
7
.5
2
e-
0
5
0
A
R
(2
)
te
st
(p
-v
a
lu
e)
0
.6
8
6
0
.7
9
6
0
.8
5
5
0
.8
7
7
0
.7
3
2
0
.4
2
8
0
.7
5
3
H
a
n
se
n
T
es
t(
p
-v
a
lu
e)
0
.0
0
0
9
6
3
0
.7
2
0
0
.3
1
0
0
.4
1
7
0
.0
0
3
2
7
0
.0
0
9
7
8
0
.1
6
5
D
a
ta
se
t
is
tr
im
m
ed
a
t
1
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
le
v
el
a
t
b
o
th
ta
il
s
fo
r
a
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
th
e
ta
b
le
.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
is
b
y
tw
o
-s
te
p
sy
st
em
G
M
M
;
y
ea
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
a
d
d
ed
;
h
ig
h
-t
ec
h
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
y
is
in
cl
u
d
ed
fo
r
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
in
co
lu
m
n
(1
);
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
(1
),
(2
)
a
n
d
(5
).
L
ev
el
s
o
f
I
/
K
a
n
d
(I
/
K
)2
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
3
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
G
M
M
ty
p
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
fi
rs
t-
d
iff
er
en
ce
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
;fi
rs
t
d
iff
er
en
ce
s
o
f
I
/
K
a
n
d
(I
/
K
)2
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
2
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
G
M
M
ty
p
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
le
v
el
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
;C
F
/
K
,
Y
/
K
,
C
O
V
,
D
A
R
d
a
te
d
a
t
t-
1
p
lu
s
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
in
ea
ch
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
u
se
d
a
s
st
a
n
d
a
rd
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
.
W
C
-r
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
d
ju
st
m
en
t.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
115
Table 31: Test for Financing Constraints in the High-Tech Industries
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
SOEs Private
(I/K)it Large Medium&Small Large Medium&Small
(I/K)i,t−1 0.0146 -0.0834 -0.0675 -0.218**
(0.0852) (0.129) (0.216) (0.109)
(I/K)2i,t−1 0.137** 0.0799 -0.163 -0.0112
(0.0535) (0.0967) (0.164) (0.104)
(CF/K)i,t−1 -0.0180 0.0193 0.630 0.0217
(0.202) (0.0126) (1.093) (0.0160)
(Y/K)i,t−1 0.0518 0.0215* 0.0254 0.0181***
(0.0374) (0.0125) (0.0211) (0.00684)
COVi,t−1 -0.0882 -0.00224 1.060 -0.0391
(0.0857) (0.0228) (0.929) (0.0424)
DARi,t−1 0.0318 -0.125** -1.178 0.0404
(0.153) (0.0615) (1.463) (0.0642)
Time dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 282 5,399 29 6,208
Number of firm 111 2,157 18 2,820
F test(p-value) 1.62e-06 0.0220 0.494 7.17e-09
AR(1) test(p-value) 0.104 0.257 0.769 0.253
AR(2) test(p-value) 0.763 0.431 0.272 0.614
Hansen Test(p-value) 0.204 0.551 0.398 0.155
Dataset is trimmed at 1 percentile level at both tails for all the regressors reported
in the table. The estimation is by two-step system GMM;size dummies are intro-
duced in the all-size regressions in column (1) and (4). Levels of I/K and (I/K)2
dated at t-3 are used as GMM type instruments for the first-difference equation;first
differences of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-2 are used as GMM type instruments for
the level equation;CF/K, Y/K, COV , DAR dated at t-1 plus time and industry
dummies are used as standard instruments(for column (1) and (4), size dummies
are also included). WC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for het-
eroscedasticity adjustment.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 32: Test for Financing Constraints in the Non High-Tech Industries
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
SOEs Private
(I/K)it Large Medium&Small Large Medium&Small
(I/K)i,t−1 -0.0182 -0.222* -0.188** -0.274***
(0.144) (0.125) (0.0958) (0.0653)
(I/K)2it 0.250 0.0442 0.290* -0.0524
(0.196) (0.0713) (0.164) (0.0473)
(CF/K)i,t−1 -0.0818 0.00735 0.0303 0.0273***
(0.161) (0.00512) (0.0435) (0.00235)
(Y/K)i,t−1 0.00931 0.0250*** 0.0193*** 0.0216***
(0.0162) (0.00460) (0.00446) (0.00101)
COVi,t−1 0.0132 -0.00189 0.00135 0.0154**
(0.0260) (0.00516) (0.0671) (0.00626)
DARi,t−1 -0.0398 0.0560*** 0.115 0.0714***
(0.0580) (0.0176) (0.0769) (0.00918)
Time dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,397 71,773 1,524 280,040
Number of firm 1,013 25,962 761 114,805
F test(p-value) 0.128 0 0 0
AR(1) test(p-value) 0.280 0.0270 0.00496 2.58e-10
AR(2) test(p-value) 0.502 0.0217 0.755 0.0142
Hansen Test(p-value) 0.287 9.58e-07 0.294 2.81e-07
Dataset is trimmed at 1 percentile level at both tails for all the regressors reported
in the table. The estimation is by two-step system GMM;size dummies are intro-
duced in the all-size regressions in column (1) and (4). Levels of I/K and (I/K)2
dated at t-3 are used as GMM type instruments for the first-difference equation;first
differences of I/K and (I/K)2 dated at t-2 are used as GMM type instruments for
the level equation;CF/K, Y/K, COV , DAR dated at t-1 plus time and industry
dummies are used as standard instruments(for column (1) and (4), size dummies
are also included). WC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for het-
eroscedasticity adjustment.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX
A.1 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
I describe the M&A policies in Table A1 and Table A2. And Table A3 and Table A4
illustrate major merger and acquisitions transactions in the Chinese steel industry between
1997 and 2012.
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A.2 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.2.1 Linkage of Integrated Facilities
Our data set reports information for each individual stage of integrated facilities but does
not directly link machines/furnaces across stages within firms. The majority of firms in our
sample operate multiple equipment in each production stage, therefore a firm could run
several integrated facilities. In practice, within firms, integrated facilities are independent
of each other. A subset of equipment in the upstream supplies intermediate materials only
to certain equipment in the downstream. The supply chain remains fixed as the linkage
is determined at the design stage to ensure that production capacity of each individual
stage should be in proportion to its immediate downstream. In the process of production,
sintering plants deliver sinter directly to blast furnaces that are tied to them through
leather belts. The iron making plants, in turn, are in charge of transporting smelted iron
to the downstream basic oxygen furnaces right after the iron leaves the blast furnaces.
Production of each stage are strictly aligned with one another, and output of each stage
is transferred in time to the downstream stages. Based on these features of the vertically-
integrated firms, production of two consecutive stages in the same periods should be a good
criterion to identify linkage across stages, and we can ignore inventory and also dynamic
decisions, etc. As an industry convention, the ratio of iron production to steel production
is roughly 1 and that of sinter to iron is 1.25.1 The scatter plots in figure A1 and A2
provide convincing evidence to justify the linkage that we identified.
1The information on the criterion of internal linkage in the steel value chain comes from a phone interview
with an engineer at the Design & Research Institute of Wuhan Iron & Steel Group in July 2016.
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Figure A1: Linkage: Sintering-Iron Making
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Figure A2: Linkage: Iron Making-Steel Making
A.2.2 Algorithm
As discussed in Ackerberg et al. (2015), the GMM estimation approach that we take to the
finite samples is subject to the convergence of local minimums. To address this concern, we
follow a flexible algorithm to set initial values for the objective function. We start from the
OLS estimates θols ≡ (αols, βols, γols) (estimated elasticities for labor, capita and material
input respectively), and then we draw 100 random vectors v ≡ (vl, vk, vr) from a uniform
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distribution ranged from 0.8 to 1.2.2 We give perturbation to the OLS estimates using the
random vectors v and make 100 sets of initial values at θp ≡ θols · v′, p = 1, 2, ..., 100. For
each set of initial values, we obtain an optimal θˆp, and we value the objective function using
θˆp. Finally we pick our estimates of θ˜ from the minimal values of the objective functions
using these 100 different sets of initial values.3
A.2.3 Nature of Internal Configuration: a Heuristic Model
We abstract here from decisions on total investment in production capacity. That is, we
take investment in production capacity as given, and analyze firms’ choice with respect to
the size of equipment to achieve this goal. A simple example illustrates the firms’ problem.
A firm plans to increase its iron making capacity by 1000m3.4 It has two options, i.e. to
build a single 1000m3 furnace (option 1) or to build two identical 500m3 furnaces (option
2). Installation takes one period to realize and production takes place in period 2. Without
loss of generality, we restrict our discussion to two periods. The firm faces uncertainty in
demand in period 2, i.e., with probability p, it will face a booming market with strong
demand, which we denote a high state (H), and with probability 1 − p a downturn with
sluggish demand, which we denote a low state (L).
• Payoff
The payoff of option 1 (2) is pi1H(pi2H) in H state and pi1L(pi2L) in L state. As indicated
by our empirical analysis, iron making displays increasing returns to scale. Hence, the
economies of scale implies that pi1H > pi2H . In addition, production flexibility of smaller
furnaces in the low state implies that pi2L > pi1L.
• Investment cost
2We relax the range to (0.7,1.3) and (0.9,1.1) too, and obtained robust estimates.
3Ideally, one can expand the number of initial-value sets for robustness check. In our case, the conver-
gence is reached among these 100 sets of values.
4In practice, firms make capacity decisions in terms of m3 instead of tonnage. However, the production
capacity in terms of tonnage of two 500m3 is not necessarily equal to that of a single 1000m3.
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We discussed in section 5.1 that investment costs per unit of capacity (c) increase with
furnace size, i.e. c1 > c2. Thereby the total investment cost under option 1 is higher
than that under option 2, f1 = 1000 ∗ c1 > f2 = 500 ∗ 2 ∗ c2.
• Expected payoffs under two options
v1 = ppi1H + (1− p)pi1L − f1
v2 = ppi2H + (1− p)pi2L − f2
The firm’s optimal internal configuration realizes the highest payoff. The firm chooses to
build a 1000m3 furnace if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
pi2L − pi1L + f1 − f2
pi2L − pi1L + pi1H − pi2H < p (A1)
Intuitively, if the benefit of economies of scale is large enough to offset the higher cost in
building a larger furnace, and the probability of a high state is high, then it is optimal for
the firm to build a single plant instead of building two smaller plants.
In practice, firms may face various constraints that affect their decisions.
• Regulatory constraints
The regulatory constraints that firms face building larger plants could be translated
into an additional cost (E) to the regular investment cost, so the total investment cost
becomes f˜1 = f1 + E. Other things equal, the LHS of equation (A1) increases to
pi2L−pi1L+f˜1−f2
pi2L−pi1L+pi1H−pi2H , which may induce the firm to install two 500m
3 furnaces instead.
• Capital constraints
Credit constraints that firms face create a wedge (τ > 1) between the per unit invest-
ment costs of constrained and the unconstrained firms, which leads to an increase in
the differences in the total investment costs under two investment options. That is,
f˜1 − f˜2 = 1000 ∗ τ ∗ (c1 − c2) > f1 − f2, which in turns drives up the LHS of equation
(A1). Other things equal, firms are more likely to install two 500m3 furnaces.
• Human capital constraints
The lack of human capital and capable managers likely prevents larger plants from
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achieving their full production potential, thereby lowering the benefits of economies of
scale. So a firm facing human capital constraints has a lower pi1H−pi2H , which increases
the LHS of equation (A1), and thereby increasing the likelihood it builds two 500m3
furnaces.
• Raw material constraints
Smaller furnaces are more flexible in the quality of their inputs they can use. This is
a different kind of flexibility than being cheaper to start-up/shutdown in the face of
changing demand conditions. Raw material constraints can be reflected in equation
(A1) in various ways. For example, in a high state, the market may be short of good
quality iron ore. In this case, other things equal, a two 500m3 can even do better than
a 1000m3 furnace. When a firm is constrained in their access to higher quality raw
materials, the flexibility of the smaller furnaces in raw materials can (partially) offset
the disadvantage of diseconomies of scale, help close the gap between pi1H and pi2H , and
result in an increase in the LHS of equation (A1). In short, a firm facing raw material
constraints is more likely to install two 500m3 furnaces.
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A.3 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
A.3.1 Definition of SOE
In Chapter 3, I follow Jefferson et al. (2003) and Brandt et al. (2012) to categorize own-
ership by a firm’s registration type. As to SOEs, as indicated by Table A5, firms that are
registered as state-owned enterprises, state-owned jointly operated enterprises and wholly
state-owned companies are defined as SOEs throughout the analysis. However, this defi-
nition has its flaws as it may omit firms that are registered as other limited liability (159)
and shareholding limited (160) but are in reality controlled by the state. To examine the
importance of the SOEs in the “Other domestic” category disguised by modern corporate
governance, I identify firms in type 159 and 160 as “disguised” SOEs if state capital of the
firms accounts for majority shares. Table A6 reports the number and the gross value of
industrial output (GVIO) shares of SOEs and “disguised” SOEs respectively.
The “disguised” SOEs contributed to 4.1% of GVIO in the manufacturing industries in
1998, whereas the share increased to 4.9% in 2007. On the contrary, the GVIO share of the
SOEs by registration type dropped dramatically from 39.2% to 8.5%. The two opposing
patterns indicate the increasing role the “disguised” SOEs plays in the state sector. In
the smelting and pressing of ferrous metals industry, or broadly defined steel industry, the
“disguised” SOEs play a more significant role compared with the average manufacturing
industries, as the GVIO share amounted to 10.1% in the industry in 2007. In Chapter 3,
the inclusion of the “disguised” SOEs does not affect the main conclusion. In addition, our
sample that Chapter 2 draws on already incorporates the “disguised” SOEs.
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Table A5: Ownership Classification
Code Ownership category
State-owned
110 State-owned enterprises
141 State-owned jointly operated enterprises
151 Wholley state-owned companies
Collective-owned
120 Collective-owned enterprises
130 Shareholding cooperatives
142 Collective jointly operated enterprises
HMT-owned
210 Overseas joint ventures
220 Overseas cooperatives
230 Overseas wholly owned enterprises
240 Overseas shareholding limited companies
Foreign-owned
310 Foreign joint ventures
320 Foreign cooperatives
330 Foreign wholly owned enterprises
340 Foreign shareholding limited companies
Private
171 Private wholly owned enterprises
172 Private-cooperative enterprises
173 Private limited liability companies
174 Private shareholding companies
Other domestic
159 Other limited liability companies
160 Shareholding limited companies
143 State-collective jointly operated enterprises
149 Other jointly operated enterprises
190 Other enterprises
Source: Jefferson et al. (2003) Appendix.
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Table A6: SOEs and Disguised SOEs
Total Manufacturing Industries
1998 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm number GVIO share Firm number GVIO share
SOEs 47,104 39.20% 6,962 8.50%
Disguised SOEs 2,703 4.10% 2,345 4.90%
Smelting And Pressing Of Ferrous Metals
1998 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm number GVIO share Firm number GVIO share
SOEs 792 64.20% 156 22.60%
Disguised SOEs 50 5.10% 57 10.10%
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Table A7: 2-Digit Industry Classification
Code Industry
13 Agricultural and Sideline Foods Processing
14 Food Production
15 Beverage Production
16 Tobacco Products Processing
17 Textile Industry
18 Clothes, Shoes and Hat Manufacture
19 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products
21 Furniture Manufacturing
22 Papermaking and Paper Products
23 Priting and Record Medium Reproduction
24 Cultural, Educational and Sports Articles Production
25 Petroleum Processing, Coking and Nuclear Fuel Processing
26 Raw Chemical Material & Chemical Products
27 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products
28 Chemical Fiber
29 Rubber Products
30 Plastic Products
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals
34 Metal Products
35 Ordinary Machinery Manufacturing
36 Special Equipment Manufacturing
37 Transport Equipment Manufacturing
39 Electric Machines and Apparatuses Manufacturing
40 Communications Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing
41 Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery Manufacture
42 Craftwork and Other Manufactures
43 Waste Resources and Old Material Recycling and Processing
Source: China Data Online. http://chinadataonline.org/member/hyn/
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Table A8: High-tech Industry Classification
Industry Code
Nuclear Fuel Processing 253
Informational Chemical Products 2665
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 27
Chemical Medicine Manufacture 271+272
Biological and Biochemical Products 276
Sanitation Materials and Medical Articles 277
Aerospace and Aeronautic Equipment 376
Aeroplane Manufacture and Repair 3761
Aerospace Equipment 3762
Other Flying Equipment 3769
Electronic and Communications Equipment Manufacturing 40-404
Communications Equipment 401
Communications Transmitting Equipment 4011
Communications Exchange Equipment 4012
Communications End-equipment 4013
Mobile Communications and End Equipment 4014
Radar and Set Equipment 402
Broadcasting and TV Equipment 403
Electronic Parts 405
Electric Vacuum Parts 4051
Semiconductor Products 4052
Electronic Parts 4053
Photoelectron Parts and other Electronic Parts 4059
Electronic Components 406
Home Audio-Visual Equipment 407
Other Electronic Equipment 409
Electronic Computer and Office Machinery Manufacture 404+4154+4155
Integrated Computer 4041
Computer Net Equipment 4042
Computer Peripheral 4043
Office Machinery Equipment 4154+4155
Medical Treatment Instruments, Equipment Apparatuses, 368+411+412+4141+419
Instruments and Meters Manufacturing
Medical Treatment Instruments and Equipment Apparatuses 368
Instruments and Meters Manufacturing 411+412+4141+419
The classification includes manufacturing firms only.
Source: The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/t20061123 402369836.htm
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Table A9: Region Classification
Region Provinces, Municipalities or Autonomous Regions
East Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian
Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan
Northeast Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang
Middle Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan
West Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang
Shaanxi,Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang
Source: The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/t20110613 402731597.htm
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Figure A3: Map of People’s Republic of China
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